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Chapter 1
Introduction
Financial markets have undergone a dramatic technological transformation over the
past 10 years. Electronic and centralized limit order books dominate the organized
securities exchange landscape. Automated execution in alternative trading systems,
dark-pools, and electronic communication networks are available to investors to
trade in most securities. Traditional market-maker markets, like the New York
Stock Exchange, have resorted to allowing participants to interact directly with
other investors using an electronic limit order book, thereby circumventing humans
in the trading process. Traditional banks and fund companies as well as other
financial institutions have invested in trading technology to improve their trade
generation and monitoring processes. The automation of this process is typically
called Algorithmic Trading and the users of this technology are called Algorithmic
Traders. The abbreviation AT is used interchangeably for both throughout.
AT is commonly defined as the use of computer algorithms to manage the trad-
ing process (Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2008)). This includes generating,
submitting, deleting, and modifying orders in any number of securities. The pro-
cess also includes determining the best market in which to trade, called smart order
routing in Foucault and Menkveld (2008), and is becoming increasingly important as
the market fragmentation process accelerates. Investors are using AT technologies
to source liquidity in multiple markets and reduce the cost thereof. The use of AT
1
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in this type of situation is rather straightforward. Computers continuously monitor
multiple markets for liquidity and submit orders that minimize transaction costs.
Investors are also using AT to process and trade on information gathered from a
wide array of sources both traditional (for instance market data) and novel (such as
machine readable news and interactive data)1.
The following chapters illustrate the study of AT as demanders and suppliers of
liquidity, as well as the information content of AT trade. In light of the recent press
coverage of AT, the paucity of academic studies of AT, and the explosion in their
use, the study of their trading behavior is timely and important.
1.1 Motivation
As roughly 43% of equity trading (by volume) in Germany is executed by AT, and
since more than 33% 2 is executed by AT in US securities markets, it is reasonable
to argue that a study of their behavior is warranted. AT is used to trade in multiple
securities simultaneously, in equity (Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2008)), for-
eign exchange (Chaboud et al. (2009)), and derivatives markets. Between the 2006
and 2008, exchanges worldwide began upgrading their trading systems to meet the
increased strain due to rising AT volumes. The London Stock Exchange3, NYSE
- Euronext, Deutsche Boerse (DB), and the Toronto Stock Exchange4 all released
low-latency versions of their electronic trading systems to meet these demands. AT
may increase system strain, in that they trade more often, but also because when
they trade they may use smaller trade sizes and a greater number of orders per
executed share (Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2008)). In their 2007 annual
report, the DB highlighted the importance of AT in their recent growth and the con-
tinued importance of AT for future growth, as well as the system strain of increased
1See: the Interactive Data (XBRL) initiative at www.sec.gov
2Source: 2008 speech by Andrew Donohue to the SIFMA Institutional Brokerage Conference -
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch060408ajd.htm
3See: www.londonstockexchange.com - Tradelect
4See: www.tsx.com/quantum
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AT activity. Unfortunately, despite the importance and pervasiveness of AT, we
lack insight into their trading behavior.
Despite this increasing importance and influence of AT, little is known about
their impact on securities markets. Interestingly, while little is known about AT,
they generate a lot of bad press. AT are typically made responsible for market
crashes, increased volatility, and instability in securities markets. The March 2nd
edition of the German financial newspaper Handelsblatt cited Karl Fickel, a tradi-
tional mutual fund manger, as follows5:
“I am convinced that trading programs in phases like in the past few
weeks increase (market) fluctuations.6”
The implicit economic criticism is that AT programs cause transitory volatility.
Transitory volatility is unrelated to the fundamental value of a firm and market
conditions and is considered to be have negative effects on securities markets. Com-
ments like the one above are quite common in the popular press. However as far
back as September 15th, 2005 the Economist recognized the potentially positive
impact of AT. They wrote:
“Simple software-based traders have been around for many years, but
they are now becoming far more sophisticated, and make trades worth
tens of billions of dollars, euros and pounds every day. They are proving
so successful that in the equity markets, where they are used to buy
and sell shares, they already appear to be outperforming their human
counterparts, and it now seems likely that their success will be repeated
in foreign-exchange markets too. Proponents of robo-traders claim that,
as well as making more money, they can also help to make markets more
stable. And, of course, being made of software, they do not demand
5This is a direct translation of the original text - from German to English.
6Source: Handelsblatt 02.03.2009 - Computer im Boersenhandel auf dem Vormarsch
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lunch breaks, holidays or bonuses7.”
The article highlights the potential for robo-traders to make markets more stable, in
addition to appearing to be more profitable. Remarkably, these conflicting opinions
co-exist in the press and have yet to be tested in the academic literature. This
dissertation begins to fill the gap between what we know and what we think about
AT.
1.2 What is Algorithmic Trading?
Algorithmic trading is an excellent example of the far-reaching effects of technology
in financial markets. Computer algorithms are now replacing humans in the trading
process. The main difference between AT and human trading is the direct interface of
algorithms with the market, without human intervention. Algorithms are processing
market (and other) data at extremely high frequencies and automatically generating
trades to profit from this data. Algorithms may also help to reduce the fixed and
variable costs of trading by reducing search and monitoring costs (Biais and Weill
(2008)), which may be driving recent increases in stock markets volume (Chordia,
Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2007)).
There are a number of uses for AT, but one of the primary goals is to reduce
transaction costs (seek liquidity). Transaction costs can be reduced by monitoring
multiple markets for liquidity and trading where posted prices are best. Algorithms
may also be used to reduce the market impact of large orders, by splitting them
into smaller slices and optimally executing each slice (Almgren and Chriss (2000)).
Algorithms are relatively good at these computational tasks. In contrast to their
non-algorithmic (human) counterparts, AT are able to continuously monitor mul-
tiple markets and securities. Humans are at a distinct disadvantage to computer
algorithms and are increasingly being replaced in the search for liquidity.
7Source: Page 1 Sept. 15th, 2005 the Economist Print Edition Technology Quarterly - The
march of the robo-traders.
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As securities exchanges increase their levels of automation (Jain (2005)), humans
are being placed at an even greater disadvantage. As exchanges speed up, humans
are left to observe market data with a delay when compared to algorithms. The
formula below formalizes the concept with a simple example:
ATinf = (Pt, Pt−1)
Huminf = (Pt−1)
Where ATinf represents the AT information set and Huminf the human information
set, P is a price, and t indexes time. In the example above, humans see prices only
after AT have had a chance to process and act on the information. Essentially
AT see the most recent price and humans see prices with a lag and must infer the
next price, knowing that AT have already observed that price. The impact this can
have in practice is addressed in Chapter 4. Essentially, at the moment a human
has observed a price, it is outdated. The effect this can have is seen in Chapter
5 where AT and human trades are studied. This does not mean that humans are
being entirely replaced by algorithms, only that their efforts are perhaps shifting to
more value-added tasks such as fundamental analysis and portfolio allocation.
Algorithmic technologies are also being used to process market data for reasons
other than liquidity seeking. This processed data may also be used to supply and
demand liquidity profitably. For instance, algorithms can monitor spot and deriva-
tives markets for deviations in price from fundamental values, and trade on this
information. Due to their ability to simultaneously, and almost costlessly, monitor
and manage executions in multiple markets, they are better able to reliably profit
from these deviations. Imagine a scenario where throughout the day deviations exist
in the prices of DAX stocks and DAX futures due to random liquidity shocks. Al-
gorithms continuously monitoring these markets are better able, due to their speed
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advantage, to identify situations where prices have deviated. Also, due to their
ability to manage the trading process, they may be better able to reduce the risks
associated with trading on these deviations. This could in turn have the positive
effect of making prices more efficient, a hypothesis tested in Chapter 5.
To develop a firm grasp of what AT is, it is also important to know what AT
is not! Although quite similar in their description, algorithmic trading is not the
same as program trading8. Program trading is the simultaneous purchase or sale
of at least 15 securities totalling at least $1,000,000 USD in a coordinated and
systematic fashion. Program trading may be executed via an algorithm but it isn’t
a requirement of the NYSE-program. In 2007, the NYSE proposed a change to
the program trading definition9. The NYSE rule change proposal was in fact never
implemented, due to industry resistance. The proposal would have modified the
definition of two of eight program trading categories to cover proprietary and agency
algorithmic program trading. This would have essentially segregated NYSE program
trades into algorithmic and non-algorithmic. The NYSE proposal mirrors the above
division of AT into liquidity seeking and proprietary trading, which are also the
commonly accepted industry interpretations of the application of AT.
1.3 Technological Aspects of Algorithmic Trading
Rapid advances in information technology and communications networks have trans-
formed the business of trading and the demands on exchanges. Algorithmic trading
is arguably only one of the most recent steps in a long technological march. Algo-
rithmic trading, is dependent on the automation of trade execution and routing, as
well as on a number of other innovations. The most important innovation that set
the stage for AT is the centralized limit order market - a market that is particularly
well suited to automation (Stoll (2006)). Jain (2005) highlights the increasing trend
8See: www.nyse.com - Program Trading description
9See: NYSE Information Memo 07-52 on Program Trading under rule 80A.
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towards automation in stock exchanges and the positive effects thereof. He finds
that the introduction of electronic trading reduces the cost of capital and increases
the liquidity of traded shares. Technology in this context has been shown to increase
liquidity, likely, due to an improvement in the information environment. Technology
is increasing the amount of information available about the demand and supply of
a stock, and this increased information is being transformed, at a minimum, into
higher liquidity.
1.3.1 Development of Algorithmic Trading
Figure 1.1 highlights the development of AT and the trading environment starting
from the 1970’s and ending in the present. During this time, trading has evolved
from a purely manual process to one involving an increasingly complex interplay of
people, process, and technology10. A number of trends have driven electronic trad-
ing and AT. The most prominent trend is the general shift towards automation in all
industries through the introduction of commodity computer systems. An important
second factor was the introduction of the Internet and inexpensive communication
technologies. These technologies allowed markets, intermediaries, and investors to
inexpensively connect to one another. Brokers began the automation process in the
1980’s by providing sales traders with computer terminals to transmit and monitor
orders submitted to the floor of stock exchanges. The broker changes were followed
shortly thereafter by exchanges (Easley, Hendershott, and Ramadorai (2007)) that
began to automate order matching and offer floor traders enhanced order manage-
ment technologies; even then, orders were mostly handled manually. In the 1990’s
and into the new millennium, brokers and exchanges began offering more complex
market access tools. A number of access technologies and protocol innovations, such
as Smart Order Routing Systems (SORT), and the Financial Information eXchange-
Protocol (FIX - see 1.3.2), made trading and investing more technically complex,
10The first electronic stock exchange was the Toronto Stock Exchange in 1976 that introduced
the Computer Aided Trading System - CATS
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 8
and also accessible. Investors have also automated the trade monitoring process
in-house by using order management systems (OMS) and other AT technologies.
Figure 1.1: Development of Algorithmic Trading: The figure illustrates
the technological development of AT throughout the 1970s to today.
The number of execution venues11 and technologies involved12 in securities trading
have made today’s AT reality what was unimaginable only a short time ago. The
sheer number of algorithms available to investors today is so high that banks have
begun to employ Algorithmic Management Systems to monitor and manage the
algorithms that monitor and manage the trade process. Two other recent develop-
ments - presented below - have changed, in distinct ways, how AT access markets
and the benefits to trading algorithmically.
1.3.2 FIX Trading Protocol
The FIX protocol was developed in the 1990’s by a consortium of banks, exchanges
and regulators. FIX was designed to speed up and standardize the message traffic
between investors and exchanges. Standardization is achieved in that FIX interfaces
are offered by all major exchanges which allows investors to develop a single trading
11Electronic communications networks, exchanges, internal and dark pools
12OMS, event management systems, algorithm management systems
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application with the ability to connect to a number of markets. Given the amount of
time and money invested in developing AT systems, this reduction in development
costs presents a significant improvement in the trading environment.
Technically the FIX protocol sits in the application layer with other common
communications protocols such as HTML and FTP. See Figure 1.2 for a better
understanding of the networking aspects of the FIX protocol. By being embedded
directly in the communication protocol, FIX is both fast and without much of the
technical overhead that would encumber a stand-alone protocol.
Figure 1.2: FIX Trading Protocol: The figure shows the placement of FIX
within the Internet reference model.
Besides speed, FIX offers the benefit of standardization. Before the introduction of
the FIX protocol, financial institutions either had to agree on a specific language
definition or manually process trading instructions. Both scenarios are dramatically
more expensive than today’s fully electronic and standardized trading environment.
To illustrate the content of a FIX trade see Figure 1.2 showing a sample message
between two banks.
The message contains a quote for a call option that expires in January 2010. The
bid (5.00) and ask (5.25) prices and size (10) as well as the strike price are coded
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Figure 1.3: FIX Trading Message: This figures illustrates a sample FIX
message between two banks.
directly into the message body. The message header contains information about the
source and destination of the quote and the exact message sending time. A response
message, not included for reasons of brevity, would include similar information and
whether or not the receiving bank accepted the terms of trade offered in the message.
1.3.3 Co-location, Connectivity, and Data Dissemination
One of the most important factors in high-frequency trading is receiving and acting
upon information before other participants can or do. This is achieved by placing
the trading application in close proximity to the market. Exchanges and other IT
service providers have a number of offerings that effectively bring the market closer
to trading applications. The DB, and other major exchanges worldwide, offer co-
location services to financial institutions. Essentially the institutions rent space in
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server rooms that are owned and operated by the exchanges. By co-locating in the
exchange server rooms, participants are able to reduce the physical distance between
trading applications, in most cases algorithms, and the market, and thereby reduce
latency. Often even these co-location services lack the space needed to meet the
demand of financial institutions. This undersupply attests to the value of latency.
Other IT-service providers have similar offerings that are not physically co-located
but close enough to the market infrastructure to render the difference negligible.
Figure 1.4 shows the infrastructure at the DB with and without co-location.
Figure 1.4: Co-location services: The figure illustrates the placement of
IT-systems, with and without co-location, required to access the market.
Source: www.deutscheboerse.de - proximity services pg. 12
The most important difference is the location of the trading engine as this is where
algorithms reside. With the proximity solution, shown in Figure 1.4 the entire
trading infrastructure in located within the DB IT-environment. Besides reducing
access time to the market, co-location ensures similar up-time and infrastructure
availability as for the Xetra trading system.
Another important factor is connectivity, i.e. the network being used to contact
the market. Exchanges generally offer a number of ways to connect to their mar-
kets. To access Xetra, participants can use a normal Internet connection or leased
lines provided by the DB or connectivity providers (cf. Deutsche Telekom or BT
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 12
Systems). Leased lines are available in a number of connection speeds depending
on the participant’s requirements and willingness to pay. Connection speeds range
from 64 kilobits per second to one gigabit per second. One can only assume that
faster connections are worth the added cost.
Exchanges have also made numerous changes to their data dissemination ser-
vices, which distribute trade and order book data to subscribers. Because of the
investment in trading technologies and the increased usage of AT, exchanges are
increasingly distributing trade and order book updates in real-time, rather than
delayed. Another important change is the manner in which data is being dissemi-
nated. In the past, exchanges disseminated order book snap-shot, or netted, data
every couple of seconds. This level of granularity is no longer enough to meet the
demands of AT and other high-frequency traders. The increase in the granularity
and timeliness of available data has surely driven some of the recent increases in AT
and this trend is expected to continue.
1.4 Research Questions
The goal of this dissertation is to study how AT contributes to the price discovery
process, as well as to study how AT contributes to the liquidity production and
consumption process. The research contained herein lays the foundation for a deeper
analysis of a number of interesting questions on AT. The research questions are
broken down into two distinct topics: information and liquidity. The first research
question is as follows:
RQ1: Are AT more informed than humans?
This question is addressed in two sections but with the same general econometric
techniques. This question is of great importance to regulators, market operators,
and investors alike. If AT, and therefore roughly 50% of trades in Germany, are
uninformed, then they are more likely to cause market instability and contribute to
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transitory volatility. The second research question deals with liquidity consumption
and productions and is as follows:
RQ2: Does AT contribute to or diminish market liquidity?
If AT continuously monitor the market for liquidity, what effect does this have on
market liquidity as a whole? The question is critical in that we have few indications
from the literature as to how AT demand and supply liquidity. We are essentially
unable to venture an educated guess as to when and why AT supply and demand
liquidity and whether or not they exacerbate or smooth it. These two questions are
addressed in the following chapters.
1.5 Overview and Structure
In Chapter 2, a general literature overview is introduced on the subject of AT
and liquidity and price discovery as well as the intersection of the two. Chapter 3
presents some general institutional details. Chapter 4 is an event study of the effect
of a latency reducing system upgrade on liquidity and information. The chapter is
based on joint working paper between the author of this dissertation and a fellow
Ph. D. student at the University of Karlsruhe, Andreas Storkenmaier. In Chapter
5 the results of an in-depth analysis of AT is presented. The chapter is based on
a joint work with the author of this dissertation and Terrence Hendershott at the
University of California at Berkeley, Haas School of Business. Chapter 6 concludes
and presents future work.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter provides an overview of the literature. A more focused review of the
literature is provided again in Chapters 4 and 5 as it applies to the specific sec-
tions. The literature presented in this chapter represents the general context, rather
than the specific relevance of each paper. This chapter also presents the literature
regarding the interdependence of liquidity, information and price discovery. Most
importantly, the current literature gaps are highlighted, specifically with respect to
AT.
2.1 Algorithmic Trading
Only recently have financial researchers begun to provide indirect evidence on the
positive effects of AT on financial markets. More specifically, financial researchers
have only now begun to focus their attention on these specific traders. Two recent
working papers Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2008) and Chaboud et al. (2009)
are the first to address the topic. Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2008) use
a proxy for AT, message traffic, and find that increases in AT improve liquidity
and the efficiency of prices at the NYSE. Chaboud et al. (2009) use a more direct
instrument to study AT in foreign exchange markets. They identify AT as orders
that are submitted using the electronic brokering systems (EBS) offered by Reuters,
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while orders submitted via other systems are classified as human. Chaboud et al.
(2009) study find that AT order-flow is less informed and that AT orders do not
contribute to volatility. Both results are interesting given the representation of AT
as pariahs in the media.
Both working papers define AT similarly. Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld
(2008) define AT as:
“...the use of computer algorithms to automatically make certain
trading decisions, submit orders, and manage those orders after sub-
mission.1”
The focus of the Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2008) definition is on the
automation of the entire trading process. Where Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld
(2008) focus on the individual activities Chaboud et al. (2009) describe AT in the
foreign exchange market as a process
“...where computer algorithms directly manage the trading process
at high frequency.2”
The focus of the Chaboud et al. (2009) paper is not only on the trading process, but
also the speed with which the process is managed, i.e. high frequency. Competing
definitions do exist but are similar to the above two and do not further contribute to
our understanding of the topic. The essence is that computers are managing, with
the help of algorithms, all or parts of the trading process. The definitions above
leave some room for interpretation. AT is perhaps best described as a continuum of
automation decisions in trading and investing.
Algorithmic technologies are also being used to automate the process of gather-
ing, processing and interpreting information (Tetlock (2007), Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky,
1Source: Page 1 of Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2008).
2Source: Page 1 of Chaboud et al. (2009).
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and Macskassy (2008)). Tetlock (2007) reports on a trading strategy based on a sim-
ple news reading algorithm that can beat the market. While the trading strategy
would be implementable without AT, the trading signals generated by the algorithm
would not. Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, and Macskassy (2008) study an intra-day ver-
sion of the strategy presented in Tetlock (2007) and attain similar results with
respect to profitability. These articles show that the boundary between what an
algorithm can analyze and what a human can analyze is not stationary. An article
in the Financial Times3 entitled ‘City trusts computers to keep up with the news’
explains the recent trend of using computer algorithms to gather and process news
reports. Clearly the use and application of computer algorithms in the investment
and investment management process is in its early stages.
Market participants use different algorithms to solve different trading problems.
Algorithms are used to reduce the market impact of trade by spreading them over
time, as in Barclay and Warner (1993a). They are being used to consolidate frag-
mented order flow using smart order routing technologies (Foucault and Menkveld
(2008)). Statistical and index arbitrage strategies typically employ computer al-
gorithms to monitor multiple markets simultaneously (Gatev, Goetzmann, and
Rouwenhorst (2006)) and manage orders in the multiple markets. The primary
focus in these strategies is to process large amounts of market data and information
to maximize trading and investing goals.
In a recent working paper, Hasbrouck and Saar (2009) break AT into two separate
categories. They refer to these categories as Proprietary Trading and Statistical
Arbitrage (PT/SA), and Algorithmic Agency (AA) trading. PT/SA trading is trade
associated with proprietary trading desks within a bank or hedge funds and boutique
trading shops to profit from short-term information. Algorithmic agency trading is
trading on behalf of customers using AT mainly to minimize implicit transaction
costs. The PT/SA traders are using AT to process information faster and to profit
3Source: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bb570626-ebb6-11db-b290-000b5df10621.html
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from this, and are therefore more sensitive to the latency of exchange systems. This
is similar to the theoretical traders in Goettler, Parlour, and Rajan (2009), that have
no intrinsic motivation to trade and simply seek to profit from their informational
advantages. Agency algorithmic traders are characterized by the repetitive nature of
their trade. They achieve their trading goals by slicing an entire trade into smaller
pieces to reduce the price impact, as in Almgren and Chriss (2000).
2.2 Liquidity
Liquidity is defined as the ability to exchange an asset for money at a price as close
as possible to the equilibrium price (O’Hara (1995)). The more a transaction price
deviates from it’s equilibrium price, the less liquid is the market. An equilibrium
price is defined as the price that clears a market given fully informed participants
Grossman and Stiglitz (1976). This relationship is also important for price discovery,
the greater the liquidity risk, the lower the incentive and ability of an informed
investor to correct a price deviation; this follows directly from the results of Amihud
and Mendelson (1986).
One generally measures liquidity in stock markets as the difference between the
buying and selling price of an asset. More specifically, while the quoted spread
(Copeland and Galai (1983)) (Ask − Bid)/(Ask + Bid) is most often used as a
good approximation of liquidity costs, it measures only hypothetical trading costs.
The analyses in the following chapters often make use of more exact calculations
and variables which measure other dimensions of liquidity such as effective spreads,
volume, and depth (Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000)).
Other studies also focus on observed individual liquidity measures rather than
expected market-wide liquidity. In Hendershott and Moulton (2007) and Venkatara-
man (2001) the focus is on bid-ask spreads, and therefore individual liquidity mea-
sures. Theoretically, a number of early market microstructure studies of liquidity
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also focused on spreads (Copeland and Galai (1983, Glosten and Milgrom (1985,
Kyle (1985)). Specifically these studies laid the foundation for the study of in-
formed trading in securities markets from the perspective of liquidity suppliers. The
results showed that positive spreads exist to compensate liquidity suppliers for the
risks of trading with more informed traders.
Liquidity is not only of interest to market microstructure researchers. (Amihud
and Mendelson (1986)) argue that lower trading costs, measured as the bid-ask
spread, translate into higher securities prices. This finding has recently become
increasingly clear and relevant. The credit crisis demonstrated that the more illiquid
an asset, the lower its expected value; unfortunately this realization came too late
for most market participants.
The unit of analysis in this dissertation is at the individual trade level rather
than daily or weekly levels as in Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), who study liquidity
as a cross-sectionally priced risk factor and find support that liquidity is, in fact,
priced. The implications are that liquidity and the costs thereof are an important
part of asset pricing, i.e. the higher the liquidity costs, the lower is the asset price,
and are therefore first order determinants of asset prices and deserving of in-depth
study.
2.3 Price Discovery
One of the central predictions of theoretical market microstructure is that order
flow affects prices. This prediction follows from both inventory-based models (Ami-
hud and Mendelson (1980) and Stoll (1978)) and information-based models (Easley
and Ohara (1987),Glosten and Milgrom (1985), and Kyle (1985)) of market making.
The information models assume that some investors have information (are informed)
about future price changes and that others do not (are uninformed). The trades of
informed investors lead to permanent price adjustments to the information they
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convey. In market microstructure, we usually measure information ex-post. A com-
mon ex-post measurement is a permanent price change in a stock price (Hasbrouck
(2002)). Other competing measures are the weighted price contribution presented in
Barclay and Warner (1993b), the variance ratio as used in Amihud and Mendelson
(1987) and the R2 of regressions of returns on individual trades and time intervals.
O’Hara (1995) highlights the intuition that trades reveal the underlying infor-
mation of the trader and thereby affect the behavior of prices. For instance in the
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model, traders with bad-news will submit sell orders
until the security price fully reflects their information. Traders with good news will
submit buy orders until the price reflects their information. Although the results
are originally obtained in a market-maker setting, they hold for limit order markets
as well (Parlour and Seppi (2008)).
Hasbrouck (1995) and Hasbrouck (1991a) are built on the intuition that mea-
suring prices ex-post for permanent changes proxies for information. This laid the
foundation for the empirical work in the area of market microstructure and informa-
tion that followed, including this dissertation. The econometric tools presented in
Hasbrouck (1991a), Hasbrouck (1991b), and Hasbrouck (1995) are based on vector
auto-regressions, and are used to detect permanent changes in the random-walk com-
ponent of securities prices. Hasbrouck (1995) associated this permanent price change
with the information a trader possesses. By measuring the permanent changes and
attributing them to a specific trader group, one can identify informed traders, inas-
much as informed is measured as a continuum rather than a discreet value.
The price discovery process takes place when the order flow of different subsets
of the trading population is aggregated into a market. The better the aggregation
process, the better are the prices attained. Frictions such as transaction costs and
taxes as well as other factors such as psychological biases ensure that prices are noisy
proxies for asset values. The process of price discovery has been studied in a number
of microstructure settings (Barclay and Hendershott (2003) , Hasbrouck (2002),
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Hasbrouck (1995), Hasbrouck (1991a) , Hasbrouck (1991b), Hendershott, Jones,
and Menkveld (2008), and Huang (2002)). Hasbrouck’s work, as mentioned above,
provides the theoretical-empirical framework for most of the following analyses4.
Price discovery is essentially the process of incorporating new information into
securities prices, thereby keeping them efficient. It represents the trading process by
which informed investors translate information into profit. Taking the simplest case
in which a trader receives private information that a company’s share price is too
low, an informed investor will purchase shares until the price reflects the informed
investor’s information. This example abstracts away from a number of important
factors; most importantly it ignores transaction costs (liquidity) and risk. An in-
formed investor will in fact take the contemporaneous and the future transaction
costs into account when exploiting this information. This highlights the importance
of liquidity in the price discovery process.
One of the problems with testing market microstructure theories is that theoret-
ically there exist informed and uninformed investors, but the predictions are unclear
as to who these are. Data limitations are usually such that inference is required to
determine whether or not an investor is informed. For instance in Boehmer and Wu
(2008) the researchers use a data set derived from the NYSE audit trail. The audit
trail data categorizes trades into four groups: individuals; institutions; non-NYSE
market-makers; and specialists. They further differentiate the order-flow into regu-
lar institutional trades, index-arbitrage program trades, and other program trades.
The main finding in Boehmer and Wu (2008) is that the order flow of each group
affects prices differently. They also find that non-program institutional trades and
individual trades have predictive power for next-day returns. Although similar in
nature to the research presented in Chapter 5 of this dissertation, the focus of their
paper is on daily returns and dynamics, whereas the focus here is on high-frequency
intra-day price and liquidity dynamics. The models and data used herein allows
4Joel Hasbrouck is thanked for the SAS code posted to his web site that was adapted for the
price discovery analysis
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a separation into two distinct groups human and algorithmic, thus allowing for a
different analysis.
2.4 Liquidity and Price Discovery
In her 2003 American Finance Association presidential address (O’Hara (2003)),
Maureen O’Hara highlights the interconnection between liquidity and price discov-
ery. She makes clear, in a realistic setting where information is not symmetric across
participants, that liquidity has an effect on price discovery and that both affect as-
set prices. The exact relationship becomes clear in the following excerpt from the
speech:
”Assets trade in markets, markets provide liquidity and price discov-
ery, and asset prices are influenced by the transaction costs of liquidity
and the risks of price discovery.5”
The excerpt highlights some of the functions of a market, namely to provide liq-
uidity and price discovery, and also illustrates how both may effect asset prices. It
is exactly this relationship that is studied throughout this dissertation. The im-
portance of understanding the whole relationship is demonstrated (i.e. the effect of
information on liquidity and vice versa), in focussing on how technology at securities
exchanges and financial institutions have impacted liquidity supply and demand and
information processing.
Liquidity and price discovery are particularly inter-related in limit order markets,
where the distinction between liquidity supply and demand become blurry (Parlour
and Seppi (2008)). Earlier models of liquidity supply assumed that market-makers
are uninformed (Glosten and Milgrom (1985)), whereas recent research has called
this assumption into question (Kaniel and Liu (2006)). Informed traders are not
5Source: Page 1349 of O’Hara (2003).
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only placing market orders, they are also strategically placing limit orders to exploit
their information.
The distinction between public and private information has also been called into
question (Hasbrouck and Saar (2009)). In a recent working paper Hasbrouck and
Saar (2009) noted that:
”Virtually all private information is advance knowledge of public in-
formation.6”
This highlights the fact that the previous methods of disentangling public (quote-
related) from private (trade-related) information may simply be capturing two facets
of the same process - namely informed traders exploiting their information in both
liquidity supply and demand activities. By studying a group of traders (AT) pre-
sumed to be informed and known to be fast, some important questions can be
answered.
6Source: Slide 11 in http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/ jhasbrou/Miscellaneous/LatencyShow02.pdf
Chapter 3
Institutional Details
This chapter presents the institutional details required to interpret and understand
the results attained. A overview of the Deutsche Boerse as an exchange is pre-
sented. The details of the electronic trading system Xetra is dealt with in detail and
an overview of the trading day on Xetra is provided. The automated trading sec-
tion provides detail and insight into the fee rebate program for algorithmic traders.
Finally, data matching and other data issues are presented.
3.1 Deutsche Boerse
The DB is one of the largest securities market operators in Europe1. The DB is
based in Frankfurt and was founded as a joint stock company in 1992. Three of
the most important German securities exchanges are owned and operated by the
DB. The DB operates the largest electronic trading system in Germany (Xetra),
the largest face-to-face trading venue (Frankfurter Wertpapier Boerse - FWB) and
one of Europe’s largest derivatives exchanges (Eurex). The DB also operates a
pan-European clearing and settlement system - Clearstream. Xetra and the FWB
hold the dominant position in German equities trading. DAX futures, options and
1The Federation of European Securities Exchanges 2008 annual report listed the DB as number
three in market capitalization in Europe, behind the London Stock Exchange and NYSE - Euronext.
23
CHAPTER 3. INSTITUTIONAL DETAILS 24
single stock options and futures trade exclusively on the Eurex. In addition to equity
futures, most money market (Euribor) and German government bond futures (Bund,
Schatz, and Bobl) are traded on Eurex.
3.1.1 Xetra
The Xetra (“Exchange Electronic Trading”) system is the electronic cash market
stock trading system operated by DB. The Xetra system was originally introduced
in 1997 and was the first fully-electronic stock exchange in Germany. Currently
Xetra handles 97%2 of German equity trading by volume. Trading begins at 9:00 am
and ends with a closing call auction at 5:30 pm. The prices on Xetra are used to
calculate the DAX (“Deutscher Aktien Index”), which is the leading German stock
index.
Xetra is organized as a centralized limit order book. Incoming orders are com-
pared to existing orders stored in the book. If the price of the incoming order crosses
the price of an existing order they are matched. Xetra follows a price and time pri-
ority matching rule meaning that orders are matched first based on price and then
on time. As an example: given two limit orders with the same direction (sell or
buy) and price but different submission times, the order with the lower submission
time (i.e. the oldest of the two orders) will be executed to its entire quantity before
any quantity of the second order is executed.
Xetra is a completely electronic trading system accessible worldwide. Xetra
members are based mostly in Germany but there are a large number of foreign
members based in the UK, France, and elsewhere. Presently there are over 260
participanting banks and financial institutions from over 19 countries and more
than 2, 600 authorized traders. The DB admits participants wishing to trade on
Xetra based on regulations set and monitored by German and European financial
regulators. After being admitted, participants can only connect electronically to
2See Deutsche Borse Annual Report 2007
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Xetra; floor trading is operated separately with no interaction between the two
trading segments.
The Xetra trading day is split into phases as follows:
• Opening call auction with a random ending that opens trading at 9:00 AM
• A continuous trading period
• A two-minute intra-day call auction at 1:00 PM with a random ending
• A second continuous trading period
• A closing call auction from 5:30 PM to 5:35 PM with a random ending
The trading phases and the ordering are similar to those found on NYSE, NYSE
- Euronext and the LSE. One differentiating feature is the random ending of the
call auctions, to discourage manipulation of auction prices. This trading feature is
unique to Xetra but is not relevant to the remaining analyses.
The following focuses on trade occurring during the two continuous trading pe-
riods. These periods make up more the 95% (time) of the trading day. Liquidity
in DAX-30 stocks is provided by public limit orders displayed in the order book for
each stock. Orders execute automatically when an incoming market, or marketable
limit order, crosses with an outstanding limit order. Order execution preference
is determined using price-time priorities. Three types of orders are permitted —
limit, market and iceberg orders. Iceberg orders are orders that display only a
portion of the total size of an order. Iceberg orders sacrifice time priority on the
non-displayed portion. Pre-trade transparency includes the 10 best bids and ask
prices and quantities but not the ID of the submitting participant (as on the Paris
Bourse (Venkataraman (2001)). Trade price and size are disseminated immediately
to all participants. The tick size for most stocks is 1 euro cent with the exception
of two stocks that trade in tenths of a cent.3
3Both stocks, Deutsche Telekom AG and Infineon AG have trade prices below 15 euros. The
sample period overlaps a Deutsche Boerse tick-size test that was subsequently extended to other
stocks.
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3.1.2 Xetra as a Trading System
Xetra is not only an electronic exchange used to trade blue chip German stocks but
is also the underlying trading system used by the Irish, Vienna, and Budapest stock
exchanges as well as the Eurex derivatives exchange. The Xetra system supports a
number of trading modi, including continuous double auctions, call auctions, and
bi-lateral trading. Trading on Xetra can also be performed via designated sponsors
as described in Klar and van den Bongard (2008). In fact, trading can be supported
by more than one designated sponsor, similar to the Euronext system described in
detail in Menkveld and Wang (2008).
Xetra supports a number of access options and is quite flexible in terms of func-
tionality. Xetra can be accessed via the Internet, leased lines, or both. Traders
access Xetra using a proprietary interface (Values API) or via the FIX trading pro-
tocol bridge. Participants can also use a Java-based trading application called Xetra
J-Trader to trade directly on Xetra.
3.1.3 Frankfurt Wertpapier Boerse
The FWB is organized as a traditional floor exchange. Each stock traded on the
floor is associated with a lead broker. Orders routed to the floor are routed directly
into limit order books managed by the lead brokers. Floor trading begins at 9:00
and ends at 10:00 PM. Trading is organized as a single continuous trading phase
which is always supported by a market-maker. As the relevance of floor trading has
fallen, most trades are being executed on Xetra in the public order book, sometimes
however large trades are still executed on the FWB.
3.1.4 Deutsche Boerse’s Automated Trading Program
Xetra has a 97% market share of German equities trading. With such a dominant po-
sition, the competition authorities (Bundeskartellamt) must approve all fee changes
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prior to implementation. Fee changes must meet the following criteria: (i) all par-
ticipants are treated equally; (ii) changes must have a cost-related justification; and
(iii) fee changes are transparent and accessible to all participants. Criterion (i) and
(iii) ensure a level playing field for all members and are comparable to regulations
in the rest of Europe and North America. The second criteria is the most important
for the current analysis. Only AT are viewed as satisfying the cost justification for
the change, so DB could offer lower trading fees specifically for AT.
In December of 2007, the DB introduced its Automated Trading Program (ATP)
to increase the volume of automated trading on Xetra. See Appendix A for a copy
of the current ATP registration form and details of the program. To qualify for the
ATP, an electronic system must determine the price, quantity, and submission time
for orders. In addition, the DB ATP agreement requires that: (i) the electronic
system must generate buy and sell orders independently using a specific program
and data; (ii) the generated orders must be channeled directly into the Xetra system;
and (iii) the exchange fees or the fees charged by the ATP member to its clients
must be directly considered by the electronic system when determining the order
parameters.
Before being admitted to the ATP, participants must submit a high-level overview
of the electronic trading strategies they plan to employ. The level of disclosure re-
quired here is intended to be low enough to not require ATP participants to reveal
important details of their trading strategies, but enough to gauge the veracity of
the application for an ATP justified fee rebate. Following admission to the ATP,
the orders generated by each participant are audited monthly for plausibility. If the
order patterns generated do not match those implied by the strategies submitted by
a participant, or are considered likely to have been generated manually, the partici-
pant will be terminated from the ATP and may also be suspended from trading on
Xetra. Conversations between the author and DB revealed that a small portion of
ATP eligible orders may not be included in the data set. The suspicion on the part
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of the DB is due to the uncommonly high number or orders to executions (message
traffic) of certain participants which is typical of AT. Further discussion revealed
that these participants make up less than 1% of trades in total and would therefore
have no effect on the results. The ATP agreement and the auditing process ensure
that most, if not all, of the orders submitted by an ATP participant are electroni-
cally generated and that most, if not all, electronically generated orders are included
in the data.
The DB only charges fees for executed trades and not for submitted orders. The
rebate for ATP participants can be significant. The rebates are designed to increase
with the total trade volume per month. Rebates are up to a maximum of 60% for
monthly volume above 30 billion Euros. The first Euro volume rebate level begins
at a 250 million Euro volume and is 7.5%.
For an ATP participant with 1.9 billion euros in eligible volume, percentage
rebates are calculated as follows (volumes are in millions of euros):
(250 ∗ 0% + 250 ∗ 7.5% + 500 ∗ 15.0% + 900 ∗ 22.5%)/1, 900 = 15.6% (3.1)
In the example above, an ATP participant would receive a rebate of 15.6%. A
15.6% discount translates into roughly 14,000 Euros in trading cost savings on 91,200
in total, and an additional 5,323 Euros savings on 61,500 in total in clearing and
settlement costs. This rebate (14,000 + 5,323) translates into a 0.1 basis point saving
of the 1.9 billion in turnover. For high-frequency trading firms whose turnover is
much higher than the amount of capital invested, the savings are significant. See
Table 3.1 for an overview of the ATP rebate levels by volume levels.
The fee rebate for ATP participants is the sole difference in how orders are
treated. AT orders are not displayed differently in the publicly disseminated Xetra
limit order book. The Xetra matching engine does not distinguish between AT and
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Table 3.1: ATP-Rebate Program: Rebate table for ATP participants at volume levels.
Cumulative Monthly ATP-Volume ATP-Rebate
(in Mil. Euros) (per Volume level)
0 < 250 0.0%
250 < 500 7.5%
500 < 1000 15.0%
1000 < 2000 22.5%
2000 < 3750 30.0%
3750 < 7500 37.5%
7500 < 15000 45.0%
15000 < 30000 52.5%
> 30000 60.0%
human orders. Therefore, there are no drawbacks for an AT firm to become an ATP
participant. Thus, it is expected that all algorithmic traders take advantage of the
lower fees by joining the ATP. From this point on, ATP participants are equated
with algorithmic traders and use AT to describe both. Non-ATP trades and orders
are assumed human or human generated.
3.2 Data and Data Providers
The data for the following analyses were acquired from a number of sources, both
public and proprietary. The bulk of the data is accessed using the TAQTIC data
service operated by SIRCA on behalf of Reuters. System order data generated
by ATP participants was provided by the Deutsche Boerse. Market capitalization
and other firm-specific data (stock splits, mergers, and other capital actions) were
collected from the Deutsche Boerse and individual firm websites.
The TAQTIC - SIRCA data provides access to ultra-high (tick-by-tick) frequency
market microstructure data. Market microstructure data is delivered in two separate
files. One file (trade file) contains a record of all trades and the best bid and ask quote
throughout the trading day. The second file (order-book file) contains a record of
the best 10 bids and asks for a given security. The trades in the trade file are stored
with a Reuters Identification Code (RIC) that uniquely identifies a security and
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trading venue, trade price, volume, prevailing bid and ask prices, and qualifier. The
qualifier field stores relevant market conditions (open, close, maximum, minimum,
volatility interruption, etc.), trading phase, and in some cases, the trading program
(Crossing or Xetra Best). The best bid and ask quote records contain RIC, bid and
ask, prices and volumes, number of participants on each side (bid/ask), qualifiers
and time-stamps. The order-book file contains the same information as for the best
bids and asks in the trade file for the entire order book (i.e. 10 levels). This data
allows for an almost complete reconstruction of the trading day on Xetra.
The DB provided access to ATP system order data. The system order stores
the entire order history generated by ATP participants. The system order data
is proprietary to the DB and not distributed to data providers, including SIRCA.
The data records each individual order (entry, modification, execution and deletion)
submitted by an ATP participant. The data includes an order entry and modification
date and time-stamp, order type, limit or execution price and volume. Using this
data and the SIRCA public data the market can be recreated and broken down
into AT and human generated order flow. These data are the basis for the results
attained in the following chapters.
Chapter 4
Latency, Liquidity and
Algorithmic Trading
On April 23rd, 2007, the Deutsche Boerse made the most important upgrade to
their trading system since 2002 by introducing Xetra 8.0. The new release of Xetra
reduced average system latency from 50 ms to 10 ms round trip. Trading costs
decreased by between 1 and 4 basis points. The liquidity increase is the result of
lower adverse selection costs that are only partially translated into higher liquidity.
This is interpreted as a decrease in the competition between liquidity suppliers, and
specifically between liquidity suppliers employing high-frequency trading strategies
(such as algorithmic traders) and those not using such technologies. Trade correlated
information fell dramatically, post-upgrade. Price discovery shifted from being pre-
dominantly trade-correlated (private) to predominantly quote-correlated (public).
Together these findings are evidence of the positive (liquidity increasing) impact of
latency on liquidity and price discovery in an electronic limit or market.
4.1 Introduction and Literature Review
With the advent of fully electronic trading (Jain (2005)), the IT-systems used by ex-
changes to match and report orders are becoming increasingly important. Investors
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are increasingly using technology to translate their investment decisions into orders.
This increased use of technology has also driven an unprecedented increase in the
number of orders per trade (Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2008)), volume
(Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2007)), and the number of transactions. These
two trends in securities trading have increased the strain on the exchange systems
used to match and report trades. This increase in system capacity and AT can have
a number of effects on liquidity and information, all of which are either unknown or
disputed. These effects are studied in the following.
As more investors are using technology to mange their orders, exchange systems
can come under great stress. An unfortunate example of this is the recent London
Stock Exchange (LSE) system failure1 that caused trading to cease for seven hours.
This system failure, caused by a flood of orders in response to the Freddie Mac
and Fannie Mae bailouts, makes painfully clear the importance of IT-systems to the
operation of financial exchanges worldwide. In response to increases in algorithmic
and quantitative trading, exchanges2 have been upgrading their infrastructure to
reduce system latency. This, in turn, increases the number of orders that can be
handled per unit of time. Exchanges have touted the liquidity-improving effects
of reducing system latency. In this chapter the hypothesis that reducing system
latency increases liquidity is tested. The equally important question as to how this
affects the processing of market information is also addressed.
Latency is critical in electronic trading! Trading strategies that rely on short-
term relative price differentials, such as index arbitrage or correlated-pair trading,
require near-simultaneous execution and furthermore face execution risks directly
related to changes in latency. In addition, if some traders receive pricing relevant
information before others, then the former can exercise the free-trading option of-
fered by slower investors (Copeland and Galai (1983)). Latency may therefore affect
1See September 10, 2008 Wall Street Journal - Back Online, LSE Faces Skeptics
2Deutsche Boerse rolled out their Xetra 8 system on April 23rd, 2007, the London Stock Ex-
change in June of 2007, the New York Stock Exchange staggered during Q4 2006 and Q1 2007,
and the Toronto Stock Exchange rolled out Quantum in December of 2007
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the compensation liquidity suppliers require for the free trading option they supply.
While the effect of latency on liquidity is unclear, what is clear is that decreasing
latency changes the competitive factors in the demand and supply of liquidity and
how quotes are updated to reflect public information.
Latency is commonly defined as the amount of time it takes for a trader to
receive feedback about a submitted order. Using the example of a marketable buy
order, latency is the amount of time that elapses between submitting the order
and receiving confirmation that the order executed at a given quantity and price.
Latency in an electronic-order-driven market, in contrast to market-maker markets,
is determined entirely by the IT-systems and algorithms supporting the operations
of an exchange. In market-maker markets, or market-maker segments in hybrid
markets, latency is a function of the IT-systems routing an order to the floor and
the time it takes for a human to process the order.
This is the first known study to isolate the effect of latency on liquidity and
information processing in an electronic limit order market. The natural experimen-
tal framework afforded by the April 23rd, 2007 Xetra 8.0 upgrade is used to test
the hypothesis that reducing latency impacts liquidity and information processing.
The Xetra 8.0 upgrade is unique in that a number of system changes were made
simultaneously with the sole purpose of reducing latency. The upgrade included
no market model or other microstructure changes other than the latency-reducing
system upgrade.
A panel-estimation technique is used to test for changes in liquidity. The results
show that a reduction in latency has a positive effect on liquidity, thus demonstrating
an inverse relationship. The results hold across market capitalization (Mcap) quar-
tiles (Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4) and trade sizes. Interestingly, the increase in liquidity
is driven by a reduction in the adverse selection component of spreads - which falls
dramatically. The analysis is conducted using a VAR framework as in Hasbrouck
(1991a) and Hasbrouck (1991b). The permanent price impact per trade falls from
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roughly 3 basis points (bps) on average to 0.6 bps for large stocks. Quotes have
also become more informative with an increase in the total amount of information
attributable to quote changes increasing from roughly 40% to 90%. This reduction
in adverse selection costs translates into a comparatively small liquidity increase.
As in Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2008), this is interpreted as a change in
the competitive landscape where those with the best algorithms extract most of the
surplus.
Only recently have researchers begun to focus on the effects of AT on market
outcomes. Until recently, little data was available on AT activity. Two recent studies
( Chaboud et al. (2009) and Hendershott and Riordan (2009)) are the first to have
access to detailed AT data. Chaboud et al. (2009) study the effects of AT in foreign
exchange (FX) markets using three widely-traded currency pairs. Two of their
findings are interesting: they find that AT is not related to volatility and that the
variance in FX returns is not related to AT order flow. Although no direct evidence
is found on average AT versus human information in this study, the findings indicate
that the relationship between trade-correlated and trade-uncorrelated information
changes dramatically. This finding highlights the increase in public information
processing post-upgrade due to a reduction in latency. Hendershott and Riordan
(2009) study AT trades and orders in DAX stocks and find AT to be both more
informed and greater suppliers of liquidity than humans.
The results contrast somewhat with both earlier (Demsetz (1968)) and more
recent (Bacidore, Ross, and Sofianos (2003), Battalio, Hatch, and Jennings (2003),
Bennett and Wei (2006) empirical studies of transaction costs, as well as Boehmer
(2005)), that find a trade-off between speed and cost. Boehmer (2005) states that
there is a trade-off between costs and speed that is robust over time and insensitive
to the econometric specification. The primary difference between these studies and
the current one is that herein the effect of a system-wide latency reduction is studied.
The previous studies are in effect studying two similar but unrelated effects.
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The question of execution speed involves both a microstructure and an infras-
tructure component. Using the example of a market versus a limit order, a market
order executes faster than does a limit order, but pays the spread. A limit order
takes longer to execute but receives the spread. Although there is a time component,
it is not the driving factor. A limit order takes longer to execute but does not neces-
sarily cost less as the order execution time increases. In fact, there is no relationship
between the waiting time of two equivalent limit orders and the execution costs.
Bacidore, Ross, and Sofianos (2003) address exactly this issue in their analysis of
guaranteed and non-guaranteed orders. A guaranteed order waits on average 251.1
seconds for execution and costs 17 cents. A non-guaranteed order costs only 7 cents
but executes in under 17seconds. The same study also notes that this difference in
time to execution is the time it takes for the order to interact with the floor trader.
The electronic transit time was roughly 6.3 seconds in their sample. This example
highlights two components of latency. The first is a microstructure one, like waiting
for the floor to interact with an order. The second is an infrastructure effect and
the focus of this work. The findings in no way contradict these previous studies.
Rather they represent the study of two similar but distinct questions.
The literature also shows that traders unambiguously prefer fast execution to
slower execution when holding costs and other factors equal. Blume (2002) cites a
survey from 2000 from Sanford and Bernstein where 58% of online investors state
that:
”...immediacy of execution is more important than a favorable price.3”
Huang (2002) finds that the timeliness of information reflected in quotes is an im-
portant issue and that electronic communications networks (ECN) quotes are more
informative because of the speed with which they reflect information. They equate
the speed of the trading system with the informativeness of quotes. Clearly there
are clientele that prefer fast execution and are willing to pay for it. Using arbitrage
3Weekly Notes. Bernstein Research (New York: Sanford C.Bernstein & Co., Inc., May 12, 2000).
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trades as a concrete example, the trade-off between execution costs and speed is
actually a tradeoff between execution risk and profit. If the profit is minimally af-
fected but the execution risk lowered, these traders are more likely to prefer faster
execution. They will also be more likely to trade even when the per-trade profit is
small.
Copeland and Galai (1983) made an important contribution in the understanding
of trading risks, specifically liquidity supply. They formulated one of the key costs
incurred by liquidity suppliers, something they called the ’free-trading option’. The
free-trading option is the option a liquidity supplier, or market-maker, supplies to
the market when they provide firm commitments to trade. Both quotes and limit
orders are firm commitments to trade and are exposed to free-trading option risk.
For a liquidity supplier, the free-trading option is a cost which increases with time.
The longer the option is exposed to the market, the higher is its value. In the
hypothesis development section of this dissertation, it is shown that by reducing the
duration of the free-trading option (which is comparable to lowering latency), the
cost to a liquidity supplier of the free-trading option can be lowered. This is the
only market microstructure framework with an explicit mechanism for latency.
Theoretical studies on limit order markets (Cespa and Foucault (2008), Foucault,
Kadan, and Kandel (2005), and Parlour (1998)) make some assumptions about the
timeliness and speed of trade. They assume that an increase in speed also causes
an increase in the informational efficiency of prices (Cespa and Foucault (2008)).
Further, they assume that faster trade means higher cost, although this assumption
is attributed to market microstructure (limit vs. market order) rather than to a
direct market latency effect.
A study that is similar in nature to the current one is the Hendershott and
Moulton (2007) study on the effect of the introduction of the New York Stock Ex-
change’s (NYSE) Hybrid system. While similar in theory to this study, it differs
in that the NYSE not only increased execution speed by offering automated exe-
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cution for orders above 1,099 shares, but also simultaneously made changes to the
market structure. Pre-hybrid automatic execution in a limit order environment is
only available to orders under a volume 1,099 while post-upgrade orders can be au-
tomatically executed up to 1,000,000 thereby circumventing the NYSE specialist.
These results differ in that the previous studies find an increase in both quoted
and effective spread, whereas here only a decrease in the effective spread is found.
Hendershott and Moulton (2007) attribute the increase to higher adverse selection
costs as a result of anonymous trading.
Another recent study by Easley, Hendershott, and Ramadorai (2007) looks at the
effect of a latency reduction at the NYSE in 1983. The results are interesting in that
they find an increase in the price of stocks that switch from higher latency trading
to lower latency trading. They also find a reduction in transaction costs of 13 basis
points after the switch from higher to lower latency. The current study is somewhat
different in that the focus is on studying an exclusively technological change at DB
with no accompanying market model or microstructure changes. Another differenti-
ating factor is the trading era. In 1983, investors traded almost exclusively manually
whereas in 2007 roughly 39% of trade was algorithmically generated on Xetra4.
White and Frame (2004) studies financial innovation and reports far too few
empirical studies of financial innovation and analysis of its impact. By studying an
exchange system upgrade in a period of increased algorithmic trading, the current
focus is on the study of two parallel innovations and their interaction.
4.2 Xetra 8.0
The release of DB’s Xetra system on April 23rd, 2007 and the effects thereof are
the subject of this chapter. Xetra 8.0 was the first major system upgrade since the
Xetra 7.0 release on August 20th, 2002. The release of version 8.0 is interesting in
that it provides an ideal opportunity to study the effect of trading system latency,
4See the 2007 Deutsche Boerse Annual Report p. 81
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or speed, in isolation. DB introduced no market model changes, different execution
mechanisms, or new order types. They made a series of system upgrades with the
sole purpose of reducing the latency of the Xetra trading system.
The new Xetra trading system is designed to reduce the trading system latency
from a minimum of 40 milliseconds to a minimum of 10 milliseconds. The most
important upgrade was to the trade matching algorithm and system used to match
incoming orders. Previously, each incoming order was stored by the matching algo-
rithm on the physical hard-drive before being matched and reported. Post upgrade,
each order is matched in ’virtual’ memory, saving the computationally expensive
operation of storing each order on a physical drive before matching. Other impor-
tant upgrades include an increase in network bandwidth to members and an internal
network upgrade.
The most important feature of the upgrade was the reduction in market latency.
The time between order entry and confirmation was reduced from 55 millisecond to
an average of 13 milliseconds for ’speed-sensitive’ traders. The following is a list of
the most important upgrades:
• split market data streams
• improved caching
• memory-based order matching
• increased network capacity
Each improvement focuses on a specific latency problem. Splitting market data
streams avoids data bottlenecks that arise when market participants are forced to
receive every order book update for each Xetra security. The new system allows
participants to select the market segments for which they wish to receive order
book data. Caching further improves the speed of the trade matching algorithm as
does memory-based order matching. DB also dramatically improved their network
capacity to deal with the increase in data and communications network requirements.
CHAPTER 4. LATENCY, LIQUIDITY AND ALGORITHMIC TRADING 39
Figure 4.1: Xetra Latency Reducing Upgrades: This figure illustrates the latency reducing upgrades to Xetra.
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See Figure 4.1 for a diagram depicting the latency relevant changes made to the
Xetra system.
4.2.1 Algorithmic Trading on Xetra
The Xetra 8.0 release was targeted directly at reducing latency with the goal of
increasing algorithmic trading. Recent research (Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld
(2008)) presents the effects on liquidity of a latency reduction. Exchanges themselves
promote latency reduction and the resulting increase in algorithmic trade as positive
for liquidity, which is confirmed in Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2008). In Q1,
DB reported5 that 45% of trades in their own stock were executed by algorithmic
traders, up from 37% for the full year 2007. Liquidity has undoubtedly increased
on Xetra, and worldwide (Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2007)), but whether
a causal relationship exists between algorithmic trading, latency and liquidity is an
open question.
To encourage automated trading, DB introduced the ’Automated Trading Pro-
gram’ (ATP) in December of 2006. The ATP program reduces the explicit trading
costs for participants’ orders that meet two of three conditions. The ATP agreement
(see Appendix A) stipulates that price, time of order submission, and/or quantity
decision must be made by an algorithm or computer program. The costs are ad-
justed based on total order flow for a given month; discounts begin at a minimum
of $250 million euros of executed volume. Data generated by participants of this
program are analyzed in the following chapter .
4.3 Hypothesis Development
The literature is unclear as to the effect of reducing latency on liquidity and informa-
tion. Theoretically, the model that best fits the real world scenario is the Copeland
5http://www.reuters.com/article/companyNews/idUSWEB425820080507
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and Galai (1983) model. They introduce a method to value firm commitments to
trade at the posted bid and ask prices as options. Although not the main purpose
of the model, they introduce a method to determine a theoretical impact of latency
on liquidity. In their options valuation framework, they allow for an effect of the
duration of quotes on the value of the option provided. As with most options, they
increase in value with increased duration. In the current context, lowering the mini-
mum amount of time it takes to revise or delete an order is the same as reducing the
duration of the free-trading option. The current analysis is designed to present a
stylized impact of latency reduction on liquidity and specifically the supply thereof.
By no means should the results of the analysis at the ten, five, and two minute fre-
quencies be interpreted as representative of the absolute value of changes in option
value at millisecond durations.
The original model settings are used but calculated for different latencies using
a constant volatility. The idea is to get a feel for the sensitivity of the value of the
free-trading option to a reduction in latency. The value of a European call option
is reported in Table 4.1 below, with an annualized volatility of 20% with latencies
of ten, five and two minutes and stock price of 100 and ask prices in 1ct increments
from 100.01 to 100.10. The value of the options in the table below show the average
cost incurred by a liquidity provider when submitting a sell order on a stock at a
given ask price that has a duration of two, five, and ten minutes.
The results in table 4.1 show the dramatic drop in value of the free-trading option
with a decrease in duration. Decreasing the duration by half (from ten to five
minutes) causes a drop of 30% in the value of the free-trading option. The framework
does not allow any inferences to be made with regards to the absolute value of the
trading option. But it certainly lends support to the hypothesis that by lowering
latency, a relatively large increase in liquidity may result, all else equal. From this,
one of the central hypotheses of this paper is derived:
H10: A system-wide reduction in latency will have a positive
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Table 4.1: Hypothesis Development: The table data are calculated using the
Copeland and Galai (1983) option framework. The first column are ask prices, the fol-
lowing three columns are call option values for a stock price S0 = 0 of 100, an annualized
volatility of 20%, ask prices as in the first column and durations of 2, 5 and 10 minutes.
The last three columns are percentages that decrease when latency is decreased from 5 to
2 minutes, 10 to 5 minutes, and 10 to 2 minutes.
Time in Minutes % Decrease
Ask Price 2 5 10 5 to 2 10 to 5 10 to 2
100.01 0.034 0.057 0.083 39.75% 30.98% 58.42%
100.02 0.030 0.053 0.078 42.82% 32.71% 61.52%
100.03 0.026 0.048 0.074 45.93% 34.48% 64.57%
100.04 0.022 0.044 0.069 49.08% 36.28% 67.55%
100.05 0.019 0.040 0.065 52.23% 38.11% 70.44%
100.06 0.016 0.037 0.061 55.38% 39.97% 73.21%
100.07 0.014 0.033 0.057 58.50% 41.85% 75.87%
100.08 0.012 0.030 0.054 61.56% 43.75% 78.38%
100.09 0.010 0.027 0.050 64.56% 45.66% 80.74%
100.10 0.008 0.025 0.047 67.48% 47.58% 82.95%
effect on liquidity.
Hypothesis 1 formalizes the relationship between latency and liquidity. The Copeland
and Galai (1983) model provides a theoretical lower bound on the liquidity improve-
ment. By halving latency, the maximum liquidity increase is between 30% and 50%
depending on the distance of the ask from the stock price. The central assumption in
hypothesis 1 is that some liquidity suppliers are in fact speed-sensitive. If liquidity
suppliers do not have systems in place to exploit the new exchange systems, they
may in fact reduce liquidity to compensate for the increased risk of being picked
off. The mechanism by which liquidity increases is not specifically determined but
is joint with the following hypothesis:
H20: The informativeness of quoted prices increases with speed.
As market speed increases, or latency decreases, the informativeness of prices will
increase (cf. Foucault, Roe¨ll, and Sandas (2003)). Several studies (Barclay, Hender-
shott, and McCormick (2003b) and Huang (2002)) have shown that faster markets
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generate more efficient prices than do slower markets. It would appear reasonable
to assume that this finding holds when a single market increases its speed.
4.4 Data and Sample Selection
Data from the TAQTIC data service operated by SIRCA on behalf of Reuters as
described in detail in 3 is used. Data on market capitalization is collected directly
from the DB web site, company annual reports, and is compared with other public
data sources (Yahoo! Finance, Google Finance, and OnVista). The sample period
covers the 40 trading days prior to and post April 23rd, 2007 - the event date.
This leaves a sample period between February 22nd, 2007 and June 19th, 2007.
This period is selected because it allows allows an analysis of the short-term and
long-term changes around the event.
4.4.1 Data Source
Data is retrieved directly from the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-
Pacific (SIRCA)6 on behalf of Reuters’. SIRCA provides trade, order, quote, and
order book data for a large number of stocks trading on exchanges worldwide. Specif-
ically, trades, best bids, and best asks are retrieved for the stocks in the original
sample. Each trade and quote is time-stamped to the millisecond and accessible via
Reuters Instrument Code (RIC). All prices are reported in Euros. The 110 stocks
that made up the HDAX, as reported by TAQTIC (the data access tool provided
by SIRCA) as of February 22nd, 2007, are used as the sample.
The first and last five minutes of the trading day are removed to avoid biases
associated with the information processing and inventory management processes at
those times. The data spans trading between 9:05 am and 5:25 pm local time with
some exceptions, as specified in the following. Xetra features intra-day auctions and
6http://www.sirca.org.au/
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volatility interruptions which halt continuous trading. The analysis is focused on
continuous trading so all data recorded outside these hours and during volatility
interruptions are deleted. The opening, closing, and intra-day and volatility in-
terruptions are identified via Reuters’ qualifying code attached to special types of
trades and period of time in a trading day. These qualifiers are used to filter the
data.
To further validate the results and compensate for potential time trends, Xetra
trades and quotes are matched with Frankfurter Wertpapier Borse (FWB) trades
and quotes. Since the stocks traded on Xetra and FWB are the same, this should
compensate for any time trends in the variables. The differenced (XetraV ariable −
FWBV ariable) variables should be independent of these.
See Figure 4.2 for a graph of the natural logarithm of volumes over the sample
period. The figure shows that volume does not shift as a result of the Xetra upgrade
and confirms the robustness of both the Xetra and Xetra-FWB instruments to this
effect.
4.4.2 Sample Selection
The sample contains the 110 stocks that make up the DB’s HDAX. The HDAX is
a combination of three main indexes: the DAX, TecDAX, and MDAX7. They are
the most actively traded and highest quality publicly traded German companies
and represent a broad cross-section of industries. The DAX contains the 30 largest
and highest quality German blue-chip stocks determined by market capitalization,
free-float, transparency regulations, and industry. The MDAX is made up of the
next largest 50 companies, followed by the 30 technology stocks in the TecDAX. The
index composition as of 22 February 2007 is taken. This is well before the Xetra 8.0
upgrade. All members of the HDAX meet certain minimum admission requirements,
viz: they must publish quarterly reports, adhere to IFRS or US-GAAP accounting
7See: Deutsche Boerse web site for a full description of the indexes
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Figure 4.2: Daily Volume: Xetra and FWB: This figure graphs the daily log euro volume
from the Frankfurt floor and Xetra markets. The event dates are on the x-axis and the
daily log euro volume on the y-axis.
standards, publish a financial calendar, hold one analyst conference per year, and
provide ad-hoc disclosure information in German and English.
Stocks that do not meet certain criteria are removed. This removal avoids effects
related to size, trading frequency, and price. Criteria, modified to our sample from
Hendershott and Moulton (2007), were used to prepare the data. A stock must have
traded above 1 euro and below 500 euros during the entire sample period. A stock
must have been traded continuously throughout the study period and traded at least
twice a day. Stocks that split or were de-listed during the observation period were
removed from the sample data. Stocks that were dropped from the HDAX during
the sample period were also removed. The final sample consists of 101 stocks. Table
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics for Xetra and the Frankfurt floor (FWB):
The sample consists of stocks listed in Deutsche Bo¨rse’s HDAX segment. The observation
period comprises of 40 trading days before and after the introduction of Xetra 8 on 23
April 2007. Table 4.2 Panel A reports descriptive statistics for Xetra and Panel B reports
statistics for the Frankfurt floor. Average measures are calculated on tick data. Daily
turnover per instrument and daily trade count per instrument are calculated on a daily per
instrument basis. Market capitalization is calculated as the product of shares outstanding
and the average price. All spread measures are reported as relative measures in basis
points. All monetary measures are reported in Euros.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics Xetra
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Shares (1000) 234,690 490,060 6,350 436,130
Market Cap (MEUR) 10,584 17,277 356 80,236
Price (per Trade) 70.98 47.34 3.16 351.70
Quoted Spread 12.36 15.00 > 0.00 820.94
Effective Spread 7.50 10.14 > 0.00 581.24
Realized Spread 1.92 444.67 3992.34 997.35
Price Impact 5.58 44.49 -993.50 999.64
Turnover (1000 EUR) 71,816 153,330 48 2,718,500
Trade Count 1,492 1,868 9 20,467
Per Trade Turnover 48,150 94,650 3 22,055,446
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics FWB
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Shares (1000) 234,690 490,060 6,350 436,130
Market Cap (MEUR) 10,584 17,277 356 80,236
Price (per Trade) 58.13 43.72 3.17 351.00
Quoted Spread 15.62 18.79 > 0.00 982.57
Effective Spread 6.81 12.24 > 0.00 841.68
Realized Spread 4.82 48.09 -985.88 1000.00
Price Impact 1.99 47.53 -924.86 994.46
Turnover (1000 EUR) 1,059 2,335 0.1 52,875
Trade Count 90 145 1 2,020
Per Trade Turnover 11,829 45,192 4 10,934,900
4.2 reports the average price, trades, daily turnover, and turnover per trade for all
stocks in the final sample. Pre- and post-Xetra 8 variable values are reported in
Table 4.3. The list of the full sample stocks with average, minimum, maximum and
standard deviation of price are reported in Table 4.10 in Appendix 4.9.
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4.4.3 Liquidity Measures
The now common Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm is used with contemporaneous
quotes as proposed by Bessembinder (2003a) to sign trades. Bessembinder (2003a)
compares different heuristics to infer trade direction with proprietary data featuring
the trade direction and finds that a comparison of the trade with the contempora-
neous quote using Lee and Ready’s heuristic provides the best results. Given the
current information technology and the period in which the data were collected,
using contemporaneous quotes should not bias the results.
Several proxies for liquidity are used. One main divergence from what is pre-
sented in much of the existing literature is that, rather than calculating the half-
spreads, full and round-trip spreads are presented. Quoted spreads are the easiest
and most common measure of trading costs and can easily be calculated using trade
and order data. All calculations presented below are spreads relative to stock price
and are reported in basis points (bps). In order to avoid distorted results from
ambiguity in the raw data, intra-day observations featuring a quoted spread larger
than 10%, an effective spread larger than 10%, a realized spread larger than 10%
or smaller than -10%, or a price impact larger than 10% or smaller than -10% are
removed from the data.
The quoted spread on Xetra is created through public limit orders submitted by
various participants. Let Aski,t be the ask price for a stock i at time t and Bidi,t
the respective bid price. If Midi,t denotes the mid-quote, then the quoted spread is
calculated as follows:
Quoted Spreadi,t = (Aski,t − Bidi,t)/Midi,t
The effective spread is defined as the spread paid when an incoming market order
trades against a limit order. The effective spread also captures institutional features
of a market, such as hidden liquidity or market depth. If Pricei,t is the execution
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price, then the effective spread is defined as:
Effective Spreadi,t = 2 ∗Di,t ∗ ((Pricei,t −Midi,t)/Midi,t)
Di,t denotes the trade direction with−1 for market sell and +1 for market buy orders.
The realized spread measures liquidity supplier revenues which are independent of
adverse selection costs imposed on the uninformed by the informed (Bessembinder
and Kaufman (1997)). The realized spread is calculated using the mid-quote five
minutes after the trade (x = 5).
Realized Spreadi,t = 2 ∗Di,t ∗ ((Pricei,t −Midi,t+x)/Midi,t)
Price impact is an approximate measure of the adverse selection component of the
effective spread. The price impact is the effective spread minus the realized spread
and measures the information content of a trade. It approximates the permanent
impact of a trade under the assumption that information impacts are permanent
and realized at the five-minute mark, whereas other effects, inventory and explicit
trading costs are transitory. Following a trade, liquidity suppliers adjust their beliefs
about the fundamental value of an asset depending on the information content of
a trade (cf. Glosten and Milgrom (1985)). The simple price impact of a trade is
calculated as follows:
Price Impacti,t = 2 ∗Di,t ∗ ((Midi,t+x −Midi,t)/Midi,t)
The results are reported below. The simple price impact gives us an indication as to
the information content of trades. More robust information measures are presented
in the following information section.
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4.4.4 Calculation
Minute-by-minute observations are aggregated to a daily frequency to capture the
intra-day dynamics of each variable but avoid some of the noise associated with a
higher sampling frequency (trade-by-trade or quote-by-quote). Table 4.3 reports the
sample summary statistics.
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The time-series mean of each variable is calculated per stock. The cross-sectional
means of the variables are reported in table 4.3. Trade prices on Xetra range from
3.16 euros to 351.70 euros with a sample mean of 70.98. The average stock trades
1,492 times a day which translates into roughly three times per minute. Table 4.2
shows an interesting phenomenon, viz. generally in order-driven markets without
designated market makers, the effective spread should be greater than the quoted
spread. The results show that the quoted spread is on average larger than the
effective spread. This indicates that traders monitor the market and trade when
spreads are lower than average. This also indicates that a great deal of order splitting
occurs and that it is worthwhile to do so.
4.4.4.1 Spread Decomposition
Table 4.2 reports the descriptive statistics for the sample. Panel A reports the
descriptive statistics for Xetra while Panel B gives those for the FWB. The following
analysis of liquidity focuses on the differenced8 results to mitigate any time effects in
the sample. The table shows clearly that quoted spreads are smaller on Xetra while
effective spreads are somewhat greater. This, coupled with a smaller price impact,
leaves a large realized spread for FWB trades. These results confirm other empirical
studies that find that repeated interactions, by humans, lead to lower execution
costs due to an ability to avoid informed trades (Hendershott and Moulton (2007)).
Other clear differences are the number of trades per day and the average turnover
per trade, both considerably higher on Xetra.
Table 4.3 reports the mean and standard deviations of quoted, effective, and re-
alized spread, the price impact, and summed daily impulse response function (trade
innovation). Table 4.3 shows a decrease in measures of trading costs (quoted and
effective spreads) an increase in liquidity supplier revenues, and a corresponding
drop in price impact or information, post-upgrade. Most interestingly, the robust
8i.e QuotedSpreadreported = QuotedSpreadXetra −QuotedSpreadFWB
CHAPTER 4. LATENCY, LIQUIDITY AND ALGORITHMIC TRADING 52
information results show a decline from 4.42 bps to 1.19 bps and the results are
consistent across all Mcap categories.
4.5 Liquidity Analysis
Each equation is estimated for each setting, once for Xetra alone, once on FWB
values and once on the difference. The focus of the analysis is on the differenced
results but the findings hold for both settings (Xetra and differenced). To test
the hypothesis that reducing latency has an effect on liquidity, regressions of the
following form are estimated:
LMi,t = αi + δXetra8i,t + βV DAXt + i,t (4.1)
where liquidity measure (LM) is the quoted spread, effective spread, realized spread,
and price impact on date t for stock i. αi are fixed cross-sectional effects for each
individual stock. Xetra8i,t is a dummy variable that takes the value 0 before April
23rd 2007 and 1 otherwise. A daily volatility measure V DAXt is included as in
Hendershott and Moulton (2007) to control for market-wide volatility changes and
the effects thereof on market-wide liquidity. For the V DAX, the daily opening
value of DB’s 3-Month V DAX − New is used for each date in the sample period.
Poolability tests show that data are not poolable. A fixed-effects model is used that
accounts for cross-sectional differences in stocks. The panel regressions are estimated
with robust standard errors for within-groups estimators (Arellano (1987)) which are
essentially White’s robust standard errors (White (1980)), adjusted for panel data.
The results are the same with only marginal differences in the magnitude of
values when a pooled regression9 is used. Four additional time-invariant control
variables are included in the pooled regression which account for a large percentage
of stock individual effects. The four control variables are: the natural logarithm
9LMi,t = α+ δXetra8i,t + βV DAXt +
∑4
k=1 λmControli,m + 
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of the average stock price on event date 0; the log of the market capitalization;
the standard deviation of returns of the sample period; and the log of the average
turnover per stock. The log of the average price controls for price level effects which
may be driving the results, whereas the log of market capitalization controls for
firm size. The standard deviation of returns are used to control for the firm-level
volatility while the log of the average turnover per stock is a control variable that
captures the trading activity of a given firm. The time-invariant control variables
are not included in the fixed-effects model since individual fixed-effects account for
those differences.
The results of the panel regression from the fixed-effects model are shown in
table 4.4 for the full sample and by market capitalization quartiles. The above
fixed-effects model is also estimated for the Frankfurt floor exchange (FWB) and
for the difference between Xetra and FWB. The results are reported in table 4.4.
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4.5.1 Quoted Spread
Table 4.3 presents the results of the quoted spread for the full sample, pre- and post-
Xetra 8.0 upgrade and separated in market capitalization quartiles. The results show
that the quoted spread for the full sample decreases from 12.45 to 12.06 basis points
(bps).
The results of the panel regression estimates in table 4.4 show that the Xetra
upgrade had a significant negative effect on quoted spreads; when comparing with
the FWB, the results on quoted spread are even greater. The results across market
capitalization quartiles are varied and generally show an increase in the quoted
spread. The results for the difference are more consistent and larger than for Xetra
alone. Only MCap quartile 4 is not significant. Since quoted spreads only measure
the trading costs for the smallest of trade sizes, a more accurate measure of execution
costs is studied in the section below.
4.5.2 Effective Spread
The effective spread is the actual spread paid by a liquidity demander in a limit
market. Table 4.3 reports effective spread for the full sample and individual market
capitalizations both pre- and post-Xetra 8.0. In contrast to previous studies and
the theoretical literature, the findings show that effective spreads decrease from
an average of 8.15 bps to an average of 6.71 bps, representing a 17% decline in
effective execution costs. The decrease in effective spreads can be found across
market capitalization quartiles. The greatest decrease in effective spread is for small
stocks, with a decrease from 25.35 to 19.04 bps.
Table 4.4 shows a significant decrease −1.91 in effective spread after the release
of the new Xetra system. The results hold when compared with the FWB results (-
1.41 bps). In no case is the decrease for the FWB significant and only in the smallest
MCap are the results not significant for the differenced values at the 5% level. These
results show clearly that post-upgrade transaction costs declined. Effective spreads
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are the most accurate measure of execution costs but are made up of at least two
components, viz. the realized spread and the price impact. The interplay of these
two components is important in understanding the drivers of liquidity change.
4.5.3 Realized Spread
The realized spread represents the part of the effective spread that a liquidity sup-
plier keeps for herself. Essentially, the realized spread is a liquidity supplier’s revenue
and it is important to measure it in this context. A reduction in the effective spread
may mean that a trade is less information-driven and hence the adverse selection
costs imposed on a liquidity supplier are reduced. It could also mean that liquidity
suppliers require lower compensation for the services they provide. For instance, due
to decreased fixed transaction costs. Surprisingly, Table 4.3 shows that the realized
spread increases by roughly three basis points. The realized spread increases across
all market capitalization quartiles.
The results also hold in the panel estimation with an increase in realized spread
of 5.39 bps after controlling for stock level variables and volatility. The increase
is consistent across MCap quartiles and when using the differenced variables. The
realized spread also increases consistently across MCap quartile. These results are
surprising in that it implies that execution costs should rise after the introduction
of Xetra 8 when, in fact, they decline. This result is, however, consistent with the
commonly-held belief that increased execution speed leads to increased execution
cost. A potential mechanism for this effect might be that liquidity suppliers re-
quire higher compensation for supplying liquidity if the chances of being exploited
are greater (free-trading option) – which might be the case when execution speed
increases and arbitrageurs are employing algorithmic trading technologies. Regard-
less of the explanation, it seems that the driver of the reduced execution costs is
the interdependency between liquidity supplier compensation and the information
content (price impact) of trades that changed after the introduction of Xetra 8.0.
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4.5.4 Price Impact
Table 4.3 shows that the price impact of trades decreased significantly following
the release of Xetra 8. On average, the price impact per trade decreases by four
bps. The breakdown of price impact into market capitalization quartiles also shows
a decrease in the price impact per trade and an increase in the magnitude of the
decrease. The results remain the same in a panel regression; the price impact for the
smallest stocks decreases by 11.39 basis points. The panel results show that price
impact is greatly affected by the upgrade, with an overall decrease of 7.29 bps and
surprisingly a 2.72 bps decrease in market capitalization Q1 stocks. The FWB and
differenced results show clearly that the information content of trade on the FWB
did not change and hence is not driven by any time trends. In fact, the Xetra-FWB
results show a significant decrease of 7.17 bps.
4.5.5 Liquidity and Trade Size
The liquidity increase could in fact be driven by an increase in smaller trades or in
liquidity for certain trades sizes. The results of the liquidity estimation regression
are reported in Table 4.5.
CHAPTER 4. LATENCY, LIQUIDITY AND ALGORITHMIC TRADING 58
T
ab
le
4.
5:
R
es
u
lt
s
b
y
T
ra
d
e
S
iz
e:
T
he
sa
m
pl
e
co
ns
is
ts
of
st
oc
ks
lis
te
d
in
D
eu
ts
ch
e
B
or
se
’s
H
D
A
X
se
gm
en
t.
T
he
ob
se
rv
at
io
n
pe
ri
od
co
m
pr
is
es
of
40
tr
ad
in
g
da
ys
be
fo
re
an
d
af
te
r
th
e
in
tr
od
uc
ti
on
of
X
et
ra
8
on
23
A
pr
il
20
07
.
T
ab
le
4.
5
P
an
el
A
re
po
rt
s
pa
ne
lr
eg
re
ss
io
n
re
su
lt
s
fo
r
eff
ec
ti
ve
sp
re
ad
s
by
tr
ad
e
si
ze
.
P
an
el
B
re
po
rt
s
re
su
lt
s
fo
r
re
al
iz
ed
sp
re
ad
s
by
tr
ad
e
si
ze
.
T
he
re
gr
es
si
on
is
es
ti
m
at
ed
on
da
ily
m
ea
su
re
s
in
di
vi
du
al
ly
fo
r
ea
ch
st
oc
k
us
in
g
th
e
fo
llo
w
in
g:
L
M
i,
t
=
α
i
+
δX
et
ra
8 i
,t
+
β
V
D
A
X
t
+
 i
,t
.
R
es
ul
ts
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
fo
r
th
e
en
ti
re
sa
m
pl
e
an
d
in
di
vi
du
al
ly
by
a
st
oc
k’
s
m
ar
ke
t
ca
pi
ta
liz
at
io
n.
D
iff
er
en
t
tr
ad
e
si
ze
s
ar
e
be
lo
w
25
,0
00
E
U
R
,
be
tw
ee
n
25
,0
00
E
U
R
an
d
10
0,
00
0
E
U
R
,
an
d
ab
ov
e
10
0,
00
0
E
U
R
.
St
oc
ks
ar
e
di
vi
de
d
in
to
fo
ur
gr
ou
ps
de
pe
nd
in
g
on
th
ei
r
m
ar
ke
t
ca
pi
ta
liz
at
io
n.
M
ar
ke
t
ca
pi
ta
liz
at
io
n
is
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
as
th
e
pr
od
uc
t
of
sh
ar
es
ou
ts
ta
nd
in
g
an
d
th
e
av
er
ag
e
pr
ic
e.
X
et
ra
de
no
te
s
re
su
lt
s
fo
r
X
et
ra
,
F
W
B
ar
e
re
su
lt
s
fo
r
th
e
Fr
an
kf
ur
t
flo
or
,
an
d
D
iff
is
X
et
ra
−
F
W
B
.
A
ll
re
su
lt
s
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
in
ba
si
s
po
in
ts
.
**
*
in
di
ca
te
s
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
th
e
1%
le
ve
l,
**
in
di
ca
te
s
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
th
e
5%
le
ve
l,
an
d
*
in
di
ca
te
s
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
th
e
10
%
le
ve
l.
R
ob
us
t
t-
st
at
is
ti
cs
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
P
an
el
A
:
R
eg
re
ss
io
ns
on
E
ffe
ct
iv
e
Sp
re
ad
s
by
T
ra
de
Si
ze
<
25
kE
U
R
≥
25
kE
U
R
an
d
≤
10
0
kE
U
R
>
10
0
kE
U
R
X
et
ra
F
W
B
D
iff
X
et
ra
F
W
B
D
iff
X
et
ra
F
W
B
D
iff
Sa
m
pl
e
X
et
ra
8
-1
.5
8*
**
-0
.5
4
-1
.0
4*
*
-3
.8
4*
**
-0
.7
9
-2
.7
5*
**
-7
.1
9*
**
.
.
t-
V
al
ue
(-
6.
35
)
(-
1.
12
)
(-
2.
47
)
(-
3.
97
)
(-
0.
89
)
(-
5.
01
)
(-
4.
78
)
M
C
A
P
Q
1
X
et
ra
8
-0
.3
3*
*
-0
.0
5
-0
.2
8*
-0
.6
0*
**
0.
02
-0
.5
7*
*
-1
.4
8*
**
-0
.4
5
-0
.8
6*
**
t-
V
al
ue
(-
2.
30
)
(-
0.
46
)
(-
1.
65
)
(-
4.
85
)
(0
.0
4)
(-
2.
30
)
(-
3.
95
)
(-
1.
01
)
(-
2.
78
)
M
C
A
P
Q
2
X
et
ra
8
-1
.0
8*
*
-0
.4
0
-0
.6
3
-2
.2
1*
**
-0
.5
6
-1
.3
8*
*
-5
.1
7*
**
.
.
t-
V
al
ue
(-
2.
21
)
(-
0.
85
)
(-
1.
64
)
(-
3.
22
)
(-
0.
70
)
(-
2.
29
)
(-
5.
06
)
M
C
A
P
Q
3
X
et
ra
8
-1
.3
6*
**
-0
.7
1
-0
.6
7
-3
.3
8*
**
-1
.2
0
-2
.7
8*
**
-1
0.
86
**
*
.
.
t-
V
al
ue
(-
3.
42
)
(-
1.
42
)
(-
1.
47
)
(-
5.
86
)
(-
0.
97
)
(-
2.
70
)
(-
4.
47
)
M
C
A
P
Q
4
X
et
ra
8
-3
.6
1*
**
-1
.0
0
-2
.6
1
-9
.4
8*
**
-2
.0
3
-8
.4
2*
**
-1
6.
82
**
*
.
.
t-
V
al
ue
(-
6.
05
)
(-
0.
58
)
(-
1.
58
)
(-
4.
12
)
(-
1.
05
)
(-
3.
54
)
(-
4.
63
)
co
nt
in
ue
d
be
lo
w
...
CHAPTER 4. LATENCY, LIQUIDITY AND ALGORITHMIC TRADING 59
...
co
nt
in
ue
d
fr
om
T
ab
le
4.
5
P
an
el
B
:
R
eg
re
ss
io
ns
on
R
ea
liz
ed
Sp
re
ad
s
by
T
ra
de
Si
ze
<
25
kE
U
R
≥
25
kE
U
R
an
d
≤
10
0
kE
U
R
>
10
0
kE
U
R
X
et
ra
F
W
B
D
iff
X
et
ra
F
W
B
D
iff
X
et
ra
F
W
B
D
iff
Sa
m
pl
e
X
et
ra
8
4.
89
**
*
-0
.4
8
5.
38
**
*
8.
51
**
*
0.
39
6.
89
**
*
9.
66
**
*
.
.
t-
V
al
ue
(1
5.
90
)
(-
0.
96
)
(9
.8
7)
(1
1.
49
)
(0
.3
0)
(5
.7
7)
(7
.9
3)
M
C
A
P
Q
1
X
et
ra
8
2.
05
**
*
-0
.3
1
2.
33
**
*
2.
51
**
*
-1
.4
13
**
3.
62
**
*
3.
69
**
*
2.
00
0.
87
t-
V
al
ue
(7
.0
1)
(-
1.
01
)
(5
.1
6)
(4
.4
8)
(-
2.
28
)
(5
.0
8)
(5
.6
1)
(1
.0
5)
(0
.4
9)
M
C
A
P
Q
2
X
et
ra
8
4.
74
**
*
0.
22
4.
51
**
*
6.
97
**
*
1.
16
5.
46
**
*
11
.3
2*
**
.
.
t-
V
al
ue
(9
.5
5)
(0
.5
5)
(7
.3
7)
(6
.9
6)
(0
.6
0)
(2
.6
9)
(8
.5
1)
M
C
A
P
Q
3
X
et
ra
8
6.
21
**
*
-0
.7
6
7.
00
**
*
10
.6
0*
**
0.
20
10
.8
5*
**
11
.6
9*
**
.
.
t-
V
al
ue
(1
4.
29
)
(-
0.
96
)
(8
.0
1)
(1
1.
63
)
(0
.0
8)
(4
.9
3)
(5
.7
3)
M
C
A
P
Q
4
X
et
ra
8
6.
69
**
*
-1
.0
9
7.
78
**
*
14
.3
8*
**
2.
62
9.
77
**
15
.4
4*
**
.
.
t-
V
al
ue
(9
.6
4)
(-
0.
71
)
(4
.9
8)
(6
.7
7)
(0
.7
1)
(2
.2
1)
(3
.3
9)
CHAPTER 4. LATENCY, LIQUIDITY AND ALGORITHMIC TRADING 60
The largest liquidity increase is in large, small-cap trades. A dramatic fall of 16.82
bps for trades greater than 100,000 euros is found. The results are consistent with
the previous analysis and confirm that liquidity increases across trade and MCap
categories. For MCap groups Q2 to Q4, the Xetra-FWB estimations are not reported
due to data limitations (insufficient transactions).
To ensure that the results are not in fact driven by a shift in trade size, a panel
regression is performed on the average trade size. Per-trade turnover is reported in
euros in Table 4.6.
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No statistically significant changes are found in average per-trade turnover. In Q2,
a small increase is found. In all other quartiles there are statistically significant
changes to turnover per trade. Their is no change in the volume ratio between
Xetra and FWB. It can be safely stated that the results are robust to changes in
per-trade turnover and relative volumes.
4.6 Information
To further study and confirm the hypothesis that less trade-correlated information
is present post-upgrade, the analysis laid out in Hasbrouck (1991a) and Hasbrouck
(1991b) is performed. The results of the VAR analysis are the average cumulative
impulse response function (CIRF) over 10 events and aggregate values per stock and
day.
Robust measures of trade correlated information are calculated. The permanent
price impact of a trade is presented in (Hasbrouck (1991a)) and is commonly used
in price discovery research. The standard settings are used, which include a forecast
horizon of 10 events. Forecast validity above 10 events found no support for effects
at lower frequencies. Let xt−i be the trade direction. Furthermore, if rt−i denotes
the quote midpoint changes, then the model is as follows:
rt = γ0,r + αtxt +
10∑
i=1
αt−ixt−i +
10∑
t=1
βt−irt−i + ur
xt = γ0,x +
10∑
i=1
δt−ixt−i +
10∑
t=1
ηt−irt−i + ux
The estimation is restarted for each trading day and stock in the sample. The above
VAR is inverted to get the vector moving average representation (VMA).
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rt
xt
 =
 a(L) b(L)
d(L) e(L) )

ur
ux
 ,
Following Hasbrouck (1991b)), the sum of
∑10
t=0 b(L), where L are polynomial lag
operators, is used to attain the cumulative impulse response function (CIRF). The
CIRF is the permanent price impact of a trade and is generally interpreted as the
private information content of a trade. Trades may contain information at lower
frequencies than measured. This measure, however, has been used in a number of
other studies with the same interpretation (Barclay and Hendershott (2003) Mad-
havan (2000)).
Using the VMA representation from above, information can be decomposed into
trade-correlated and -uncorrelated portions (Hasbrouck (1991b)). The variance de-
composition is as follows:
σ2w =
(
10∑
i=0
ai
)2
σ2ur +
(
10∑
i=0
bi
)2
σ2ux (4.2)
The information content of quotes is the first term and the trade correlated portion
is the second term. All lags are summed to get the total contribution to price
discovery of both portions. These results are reported below in basis points for
the CIRF and in percent for the information content of quotes in relation to all
information impounded into the market. By analyzing both of these measures,
the mechanism by which information is impounded into prices is studied. Lacking
sharp theoretical predictions, the statistical null hypothesis is simply that there will
be no difference between the trade-correlated and -uncorrelated information, post
upgrade. To test for differences in the amount of trade-correlated and -uncorrelated
information pre- and post-upgrade, the same regression as above is estimated for
the price impact (for Xetra), CIRF and the variance decomposition. The results of
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the estimation are presented in Table 4.7.
Table 4.7: Results Panel Regressions: The sample consists of stocks listed in
Deutsche Bo¨rse’s HDAX segment. The observation period comprises of 40 trading days be-
fore and after the introduction of Xetra 8 on 23 April 2007. Table 4.4 Panel A reports panel
regression results for quoted spread, effective spread, and realized spread. Panel B reports
regression results for price impact, permanent impact of trade innovation, and quote-based
price discovery in percent. The panel regression is performed on daily measures individu-
ally for each stock using the following: LMi,t = αi + δXetra8i,t +βV DAXt + i,t. Results
are reported for the entire sample and individually by stock market capitalization. Market
capitalization is calculated as the product of shares outstanding and the average price over
the observation period for a single stock. All results are reported in basis points expect for
quote impounded information which is measured in percent. Xetra denotes results for the
Xetra System, FWB denotes results for the Frankfurt floor, and Diff denotes Xetra-FWB.
All measures for the panel regressions are calculated as relative measures. *** indicates
significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates sig-
nificance at the 10% level. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses below panel
regressions’ coefficients.
Panel B: Adverse Selection and Quote Fraction
Price Impact Trade Innovation Var. Decomp.
Xetra FWB Diff Xetra Xetra
Sample
Xetra8 -7.29*** -0.13 -7.17*** -3.16*** 47.89***
t-Value (-17.32) (-0.42) (-14.44) (-21.04) (72.04)
MCAP Q1
Xetra8 -2.72*** 0.34 -3.04*** -1.60*** 47.74***
t-Value (-6.96) (1.01) (-4.91) (-16.05) (34.80)
MCAP Q2
Xetra8 -6.66*** -0.82 -5.81*** -2.89*** 50.87***
t-Value (-9.80) (-1.13) (-7.09) (-13.39) (41.08)
MCAP Q3
Xetra8 -8.58*** 0.17 -8.81*** -3.54*** 48.80***
t-Value (-18.93) (0.29) (-13.85) (-22.33) (35.11)
MCAP Q4
Xetra8 -11.39*** -0.22 -11.18*** -4.70*** 44.17***
t-Value (-17.22) (-0.36) (-12.43) (-16.48) (48.68)
Table 4.7 reports a strongly negative effect of the Xetra upgrade on the CIRF. The
Xetra results are highly significant (-21.04) with a coefficient of -3.16 (table 4.7).
These results confirm the results of the price impact analysis. Unfortunately, due
to data restrictions, the CIRF cannot be calculated for the FWB. The price impact
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Figure 4.3: Cumulative Impulse Response (Basis Points) - Entire Sample: In this figure
the cumulative impulse response of a trade is on the y-axis. The x-axis is the forecast
horizon in trades. The blue lines are pre-event with 95% confidence intervals. The red
values are post-events with 95% confidence intervals.
remains unchanged for the FWB pre- and post-upgrade. The effect of the Xetra
upgrade on the CIRF increases in absolute terms across MCap quartiles, indicating
that liquidity suppliers are able to avoid informed trades post-upgrade in relatively
small stocks that generally have larger adverse selection costs.
Figure 4.3 presents the CIRF pre and post-upgrade for the entire sample. Ninety-
five percent confidence intervals are included and clearly show post-upgrade trade
related information is strictly and always smaller than that measured in the pre-
upgrade period.
The forecast horizon in trades is reported on the X-axis (0 - 10). At 10 trades the
trade impact levels off, confirming the lag length selected. On the Y-axis the CIRF
is graphed in basis points. Similar graphics are included for each of the 4 MCap
quartiles. These are presented in the Appendix 4.9 in figures 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8
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Figure 4.4: Quoted Based Information (Percent) - Entire Sample: The figure graphs the
non-trade/quote-based correlated information with 95% confidence intervals. The events
dates are on the x-axis and the quote-based contribution in percent is on the y-axis.
and they confirm the results presented above and show an increase in the difference
across quartiles.
Table 4.7 reports a dramatic increase in the amount of information being im-
pounded into prices via quotes. Quote-based information increases by 47.89% and is
highly significant at the 1% level. In figure 4.4, the percentage of quote-based infor-
mation across the sample period with 95% confidence intervals is graphed, similar
to the above figures.
Visual inspection clearly shows that the ratio changes dramatically on the event
day. The statistical test in table 4.7 simply confirms what visual inspection already
reveals. As above, similar figures are included for each MCap group in Appendix
4.9 figures 4.9, 4.10, 4.11, and 4.12.
A test of the equality of variance is included to better understand the information
impounding process. In Panel A of table 4.8, the mean and standard deviation of the
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quote-based information pre and post-upgrade is reported. The standard deviation
falls by roughly half. An equality of means test is estimated and the results are
reported in Panel B.
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Using the modified Levene Test, the null hypothesis of equal variances pre- and
post-upgrade is rejected. This is interpreted as confirmatory evidence that AT may
be driving this trend. Imagine a situation where humans are doing most of the
public information (trades, quotes, orders) processing. The level of attention of a
human is variable throughout a day and is also bounded. On days where there is
a high level of activity, the proportion of information processed will be lower than
on days with less information. Limited attention and variability are not attributes
one would typically associate with an algorithm. AT are more likely to provide
non-variable levels of information processing which are considerably less dependent
on the amount of information or time of day.
4.6.1 Information and Trade Size
Technical innovations have been shown to impact the amount and nature of trade
in electronic stock markets (Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) and Stoll (2006)).
The raises the question: Is the effect driven by trade-size? To analyze the effect of
trade size, the sample is broken into three-trade size categories: smaller than 25, 000;
between 25, 000 and 100, 000; and greater than 100, 000 euros. Table 4.9 reports the
results of a regression of the price impact per trade on the Xetra 8 variable. The
trend towards an increase in the absolute decrease of the price impact remains across
MCaps and trade size. Due to data restrictions, it was impossible to calculate values
for the difference between Xetra and the FWB for large trades.
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Although there is an increase in the trade size, the post upgrade effect is largely
statistically insignificant, as seen in Table 4.6. It is interesting that as quotes become
more informative (quote-based price discovery increases), participants are willing to
trade in larger blocks. Perhaps there were more smaller limit orders being picked-off
pre-upgrade, which would explain both the increase in trade size and the greater
pre-upgrade CIRF. What is clear is that a change in trade size is not driving the
results.
4.7 Discussion and Interpretation
The preceding demonstrated how information is being impounded into prices. The
CIRF is generally interpreted as being private information. The non-trade-correlated
information content of quotes is generally interpreted as being public information.
If the hypothesis that market changes result from AT’s effect of reducing latency are
accepted, it is must be that AT are processing considerably more public information
post upgrade. By processing more public information, AT are making quotes more
informative and thereby increasing liquidity.
To make sense of the results, two AT strategies are analyzed. Why the focus
on AT strategies only? The sole purpose of the Xetra 8.0 upgrade was to reduce
minimum latency from 40 to 10 milliseconds (ms). Depending on the task, humans
can process and use information roughly every 300 ms. The Xetra 8.0 upgrades are
beyond the processing capacity of humans and can only be exploited by algorithms.
In the following interpretation, two groups of AT are introduced that may explain
the changes in liquidity and the information content of trades and quotes. Most of
the results can be explained using these two scenarios. The groups are similar to
those found in the new NYSE program trading description, and are mirrored in
Hasbrouck and Saar (2009). Both identify two distinct types of AT. They call these
groups agency and proprietary AT.
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Agency AT is essentially the automation of typical broker tasks. An agency AT
trade would optimally slice a large order into smaller pieces and thereby reduce the
cost of liquidity. There is no evidence in the data to support the conjecture that
reducing latency would impact agency AT trading strategies. The AT proprietary
group might represent an entirely new type of trader. Proprietary AT is, in-part,
the automation of informed short-term trading. These traders typically monitor a
number of markets and securities for profitable trading opportunities. This type of
trading includes some forms of program trading (Stoll and Whaley (1987)), future
and spot market arbitrage (Brennan and Schwartz (1990)), and correlated pairs
trading. These traders may also supply liquidity algorithmically as in Hakansson,
Beja, and Kale (1985).
If by reducing latency this second group of AT gained an advantage over the first
group of AT, and humans in general, what effects would one expect to observe in the
market? As AT increases, so does market monitoring. As the costs of monitoring
decrease (lower technology frictions), quotes may also become more informative.
The mechanism is quite simple; AT with information about future short-term price
changes may submit a liquidity demanding trade to profit from the information, or
quotes at which they expected not to be adversely exposed to the free-trading option.
They would submit more quotes when liquidity costs exceed their information. The
corollary is that the trade-correlated portion of trades will also fall because AT will
use their information processing abilities to compete away profits. Essentially when
liquidity is demanded, it will be demanded at prices that are more informationally
efficient. These trades will by definition have a lower permanent impact on the
efficient security price.
This finding is reflected in the realized spreads results. Although the information
content of trades falls dramatically, the effective spread only falls minimally. The
surplus is skimmed by liquidity suppliers in the market. These liquidity suppliers
are in less competition with one another than before, and are able to keep the largest
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portion of the surplus.
4.8 Conclusion
In this paper, the effect of reducing latency on market-wide information and liquidity
is studied. Common measures of information in a market microstructure sense and
measures of the actual transaction costs paid by market participants are used. The
results show that quote-based information increases in concert with liquidity. The
Xetra 8.0 upgrade is ideal to test the hypotheses that latency reductions affect
information and liquidity. It is shown that reducing latency does cause an increase
in liquidity. This is in contrast to the results found in Hendershott and Moulton
(2007) and theorized much early by Demsetz (1968).
The increase in liquidity is due to a dramatic drop in the information content of
trades and a somewhat less dramatic increase in realized spread. Two algorithmic
trading scenarios are presented that may be driving these results. The reduction
in latency seems to be a win-win situation for regulators, market participants and
exchange operators. Most importantly to regulators, prices are more efficient post
upgrade by better reflecting public information in the quotes before trades take
place. As adverse selection costs fall, market participants are also more likely to
trade. Also of importance to market participants is the fact that they can execute
their orders at a lower cost. Exchange operators are content because they attract
higher volumes and corresponding fees. One would imagine that, as the level of
competition between algorithmic liquidity suppliers reaches that of humans prior to
the Xetra 8.0 upgrade, liquidity will continue to increase. A warning is, however, in
order. Even simple systems changes may have unexpected effects on markets. The
mechanism, better quotes, by which liquidity improved was little understood before
the upgrade and likely not the expected one. The effect of reducing latency could
have been to reduce liquidity as in NYSE’s Hybrid upgrade.
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Future work in the area should focus on the theoretical underpinning of these re-
sults. Why is it that the NYSE Hybrid upgrade caused a decrease in liquidity while
a similar execution speed increase at the DB had the opposite effect? Also further
studies into similar recent upgrades (TSX Quantum, LSE Tradelect, Euronext Uni-
versal Trading Platform) could shed light on some of these differences. Finally more
detailed algorithmic trading data sets, presented in the following chapter, could also
help to alleviate some of the suspicions with regards to algorithmic trading.
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4.9 Appendix - Chapter 4
Table 4.10: Summary Sample Statistics: The sample consists of stocks listed in
Deutsche Bo¨rse’s HDAX segment. The observation period comprises of 40 trading days
before and after the introduction of Xetra 8 on 23 April 2007. Filters applied to HDAX
stocks reduce the sample to 101 continuously trades stocks. This table reports stock
symbol, average, minimum, maximum and the standard deviation of the price.
Price
Stock Av. Min. Max. Std. Dev.
ADAG 7.70 6.44 9.50 0.61
ADSG 42.13 34.50 47.49 3.59
AIXG 5.69 4.15 7.11 0.63
ALTG 35.88 17.53 55.89 14.76
ALVG 161.63 145.50 176.29 6.02
AMBG 115.44 112.25 119.73 1.69
ARLG 37.28 32.50 40.25 1.62
ATSV 18.61 16.14 20.44 0.95
AWDG 34.82 30.54 38.20 1.54
BASF 85.02 74.42 95.15 5.47
BAYG 49.24 41.07 57.55 4.10
BC8G 23.16 18.50 27.77 1.66
BEIG 51.98 47.02 55.30 1.94
BIOZ 57.91 53.72 61.00 1.89
BMWG 45.77 40.44 51.49 2.93
BOSG p 43.61 37.00 49.69 2.47
CBKG 34.34 29.67 38.20 2.36
CGYG 54.83 47.34 61.13 3.09
CLSGn 48.45 41.13 55.00 2.86
CONG 100.07 89.60 108.65 4.79
DBKGn 106.45 90.61 118.51 7.45
DCXGn 60.69 49.55 69.62 5.28
DEQGn 57.85 54.01 61.37 1.27
DEZG 10.68 9.42 12.09 0.57
DOHG 46.15 42.25 50.45 2.10
DPBGn 65.34 58.54 74.71 2.91
DPWGn 23.75 21.77 26.30 0.96
DRWG p 67.03 57.20 74.68 4.15
DTEGn 13.13 12.19 14.56 0.55
EAD 23.39 21.50 26.25 1.03
EONG 108.27 94.50 125.06 7.84
EPCGn 14.55 11.54 16.98 1.52
ES6G 56.48 46.78 60.60 2.65
continued below ...
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... continued from Table 4.10
Price
Stock Av. Min. Max. Std. Dev.
EVTG 3.63 3.16 4.39 0.23
FRAG 55.30 50.62 64.96 2.81
G1AG 20.39 15.70 24.40 2.27
GBFG 67.94 57.61 74.72 4.13
GFJG 19.88 17.33 23.41 1.18
GPCG 21.18 18.70 25.16 1.19
HDDG 35.36 30.59 40.51 1.92
HEIG 114.29 105.14 121.29 3.88
HNRGn 34.54 30.01 37.79 1.85
HOTG 76.40 59.70 91.50 7.69
HRXG 49.01 44.40 53.65 1.89
IDRG 16.22 14.50 18.59 1.25
IFXGn 11.47 10.78 12.37 0.29
IKBG 28.90 25.65 32.67 1.36
IVGG 33.12 28.35 37.42 2.01
IWKG 23.87 20.65 26.20 1.22
JENG 7.63 6.70 8.22 0.31
KARG 27.23 24.10 29.52 1.15
KBCG 12.91 10.22 14.79 1.13
KCOGn 46.11 34.55 56.77 5.44
KRNG 148.40 115.00 173.47 14.52
LEOGn 32.50 29.05 35.77 1.78
LHAG 21.04 19.56 22.70 0.80
LING 80.47 74.12 85.42 2.20
LXSG 39.42 34.89 43.75 1.95
MANG 94.69 77.10 112.40 9.55
MEOG 56.63 50.46 63.69 3.44
MLPG 18.07 15.35 19.70 0.98
MORG 52.21 45.50 59.43 2.73
MRCG 97.84 87.65 109.21 4.00
MTXGn 42.84 35.20 47.89 2.63
MUVGn 128.61 112.35 142.75 7.89
NAFG 26.08 22.25 33.25 2.59
NDXGk 25.99 18.55 31.22 2.53
P1ZGn 16.69 13.79 23.19 2.31
PFDGn 23.25 20.32 25.66 1.17
PRAG 28.97 24.02 34.50 2.54
PREGn 16.45 14.34 18.70 0.98
PSMG p 26.76 24.26 30.35 1.15
PUMG 310.04 256.44 351.70 32.19
continued below ...
CHAPTER 4. LATENCY, LIQUIDITY AND ALGORITHMIC TRADING 77
... continued from Table 4.10
Price
Stock Av. Min. Max. Std. Dev.
PV 69.23 57.10 77.96 5.00
QCEG 52.16 40.60 65.88 5.97
QGEN 12.68 11.60 13.72 0.44
QSCG 5.47 4.84 6.35 0.37
RHKG 43.67 38.05 48.17 2.26
RHMG 68.39 57.26 76.88 4.61
RWEG 79.60 74.14 85.50 2.46
SAPG 35.32 32.83 38.31 1.06
SDFG 91.80 74.72 111.96 9.29
SGCG 25.40 17.25 33.72 3.70
SIEGn 89.10 75.87 107.18 7.84
SNGG 11.09 9.96 13.40 0.66
SOOG 40.33 35.00 44.30 1.57
SOWG 64.52 52.51 73.75 4.40
SRZG 107.11 101.50 112.95 1.53
STAGn 46.46 39.25 51.20 2.03
SWVG 60.07 49.75 68.70 3.54
SZGG 121.27 88.13 152.18 17.58
SZUG 15.35 13.29 16.71 0.79
TATL 16.20 14.78 17.89 0.61
TKAG 39.99 35.00 46.53 3.13
TNHG 55.21 52.01 58.02 1.29
TUIGn 19.32 16.80 22.10 1.37
UTDI 14.01 12.12 15.82 0.54
VOSG 75.54 58.65 94.47 6.98
VOWG 107.14 90.01 119.18 7.19
WCHG 138.41 108.45 176.00 15.46
WDIG 9.06 6.90 10.50 0.94
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Figure 4.5: Cumulative Impulse Response - MCap 1: In this figure the
cumulative impulse response of an event is on the y-axis. The x-axis is the
forecast horizon in events. The blue lines are pre-event with 95% confidence
intervals and the red values are post-event.
Figure 4.6: Cumulative Impulse Response - MCap 2: In this figure the
cumulative impulse response of an event is on the y-axis. The x-axis is the
forecast horizon in events. The blue lines are pre-event with 95% confidence
intervals and the red values are post-event.
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Figure 4.7: Cumulative Impulse Response - MCap 3: In this figure the
cumulative impulse response of an event is on the y-axis. The x-axis is the
forecast horizon in events. The blue lines are pre-event with 95% confidence
intervals and the red values are post-event.
Figure 4.8: Cumulative Impulse Response - MCap 4: In this figure the
cumulative impulse response of an event is on the y-axis. The x-axis is the
forecast horizon in events. The blue lines are pre-event with 95% confidence
intervals and the red values are post-event.
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Figure 4.9: Quoted Based Information (Percent) - MCap 1: The figure
graphs the non-trade/quote-based correlated information with 95% confi-
dence intervals for MCap 1. The events dates are on the x-axis and the
quote-based contribution in percent on the y-axis.
Figure 4.10: Quoted Based Information (Percent) - MCap 2: The figure
graphs the non-trade/quote-based correlated information with 95% confi-
dence intervals for MCap 2. The events dates are on the x-axis and the
quote-based contribution in percent on the y-axis.
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Figure 4.11: Quoted Based Information (Percent) - MCap 3: The figure
graphs the non-trade/quote-based correlated information with 95% confi-
dence intervals for MCap 3. The events dates are on the x-axis and the
quote-based contribution in percent on the y-axis.
Figure 4.12: Quoted Based Information (Percent) - MCap 4: The figure
graphs the non-trade/quote-based correlated information with 95% confi-
dence intervals for MCap 4. The events dates are on the x-axis and the
quote-based contribution in percent on the y-axis.
Chapter 5
Algorithmic Trading and
Information
Algorithmic trades and their role in the price discovery process in the 30 DAX stocks
on the Deutsche Boerse are explored. AT liquidity demand represents 52% of volume
and AT supplies liquidity on 50% of volume. Algorithmic traders act strategically
by monitoring the market for liquidity and deviations of price from fundamental
value. Algorithmic Traders consume liquidity when it is cheap and supply liquidity
when it is expensive. Algorithmic Traders contribute more to the efficient price by
placing more efficient quotes and by Algorithmic Traders demanding liquidity to
move the prices towards the efficient price.
5.1 Introduction
Technology has revolutionized the way financial markets function and the way fi-
nancial assets are traded. Two significant interrelated technological changes are
investors using computers to automate their trading processes, and markets reorga-
nizing themselves so virtually all are now electronic limit order books (Jain (2005)).
The speed and quality of access to such markets encourages the use of AT, com-
monly defined as the use of computer algorithms to automatically make trading
82
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decisions, submit orders, and manage those orders after submission. Because the
trading process is central to efficient risk sharing and price efficiency, it is important
to understand how AT is used as well as its role in the price formation process.
These issues are examined for DAX stocks (the 30 largest market capitalization
stocks) traded on the Deutsche Boerse (DB) with data identifying whether or not
each trade’s buyer and seller generated their order with an algorithm. Directly
identifying AT is not possible in most markets, so relatively little is known.1
Liquidity demanders use algorithms to try to identify when a security’s price
deviates from the efficient price. They do this by quickly processing information
contained in order flow and price movements in that security and in other securities
across markets. Liquidity suppliers must follow a similar strategy to avoid being
picked off. Institutional investors also utilize AT to trade large quantities gradually
over time, thereby minimizing market impact and implementation costs.
Most markets offer volume discounts to attract high-frequency traders. The de-
velopment costs of AT typically lead to it being adopted first by high-volume users
who automatically qualify for the quantity discounts. The German competition au-
thority does not allow for generic volume discounts but rather requires that such
discounts have a cost sensitive component. The DB successfully asserted that algo-
rithm generated trading is both lower cost and highly sensitive to cost reductions
and, therefore, could receive quantity discounts. In December of 2007, the DB in-
troduced its fee rebate program for automated traders. The DB provided data on
AT orders in the DAX stocks for the first three weeks of January 2008.
Algorithmic traders initiate 52% of trading volume via marketable orders. They
initiate smaller trades with AT initiating 68% of volume for trades of less than 500
shares and 23% of volume for trades of greater than 10,000 shares. AT initiate
trades quickly when spreads are small and cluster their trades together, and are
1Biais and Weill (2008) theoretically examine the relation between AT, market monitoring, and
liquidity dynamics. Chaboud et al. (2009) study AT in the foreign exchange market. Hendershott,
Jones, and Menkveld (2008) use a proxy for AT to examine AT’s effect on liquidity in the equity
market.
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more sensitive to human trading activity than are humans to AT activity. These are
all consistent with AT closely monitoring the market for trading opportunities. If
an algorithmic trader is constantly monitoring the market, the trader can break up
their order into small pieces to disguise their intentions and quickly react to changes
in market conditions. AT could also be trying to exploit small deviations of price
from fundamentals.
In an effort to move beyond unconditional measures of AT activity, probit models
of AT are estimated using the market conditions variables incorporating the state
of the limit order book and past volatility and trading volume. AT are found to
be more likely to initiate trades when liquidity is high in terms of narrow bid-ask
spreads and higher depth. In the 15 prior minutes, AT-liquidity-demanding trades
are not related to volatility but during the same time span, AT initiated trading is
negatively related to volume.
Just as algorithms are used to monitor liquidity in the market, they may also
be used to identify and capitalize on short-run price predictability. A standard
VAR (Hasbrouck (1991a) and Hasbrouck (1991b)) is used to examine the return-
order flow dynamics for both AT and human trades. AT-liquidity-demanding trades
play a more significant role in discovering the efficient price than do human trades.
AT-initiated trades have a more than 20% larger permanent price impact than do
human trades. In terms of the total contribution to price discovery – decomposing
the variance of the efficient price into its trade-correlated and non trade-correlated
components – AT liquidity demanding trades help impound 40% more information
than do human trades.
The conditions under which AT supply liquidity via non-marketable orders is
also examined. The nature of the data makes it possible to build an AT-only limit
order book, but makes it difficult to perfectly identify when AT supply liquidity in
transactions (see Section 5.3 for exact details). Therefore, the focus of the analysis is
on quoted prices associated with AT versus humans. While AT supply liquidity for
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exactly 50% of trading volume, AT are at the best price (inside quote) more often
than are humans. This is AT-human difference is more pronounced when liquidity
is lower, demonstrating that AT supply liquidity more when liquidity is expensive.
The role of AT quotes in the price formation process is also examined. The
information shares (Hasbrouck (1995)) are calculated, for AT and human quotes.
AT quotes play a much more significant role in the price formation process than
their 50% of trading volume would suggest. The information shares decompose
the changes in the efficient price into components that occur first in AT quotes,
followed by human quotes, and then finally appear contemporaneously in AT and
human quotes – the corresponding breakdown being roughly 50%, 40%, and 10%,
respectively. The ability of AT to update quotes quickly based on changing mar-
ket conditions may allow AT to better provide liquidity during challenging market
conditions.
The results on AT liquidity supply and demand suggest that AT monitor liquidity
and information in the market. AT consume liquidity when it is cheap and supply
liquidity when it is expensive, smoothing out liquidity over time. AT also contribute
more to the efficient price by having more efficient quotes and by AT demanding
liquidity so as to move the prices towards the efficient price. Casual observers often
blame the recent increase in market volatility on AT2. AT demanding liquidity during
times when liquidity is low could result in AT exacerbating volatility, but no evidence
of this is found. AT could also exacerbate volatility by not supplying liquidity as it
dries up. However, the opposite is found in the current analysis.
Section 5.2 relates the work to existing literature. Section 5.4 describes the data.
Section 5.5 analyzes when and how AT demand liquidity. Section 5.6 examines how
AT demand liquidity relates to discovering the efficient price. Section 5.7 studies
when AT supply liquidity and its relation to discovering the efficient price. Section
5.8 provides a conclusion.
2For example, see “Algorithmic trades produce snowball effects on volatility,” Financial Times,
December 5, 2008.
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5.2 Literature Review
Due to the difficulty in identifying AT, most existing research directly addressing
AT has used data from brokers who sell AT products to institutional clients. Engle,
Russell, and Ferstenberg (2007) use execution data from Morgan Stanley algorithms
to study the tradeoffs between algorithm aggressiveness and the mean and dispersion
of execution cost. Domowitz and Yegerman (2006) study execution costs of ITG
buy-side clients, comparing results from different algorithm providers.
Several recent studies use comprehensive data on AT. Chaboud et al. (2009)
study the development of AT in the foreign exchange market on the electronic
broking system (EBS) in three currency pairs, viz. euro-dollar; dollar-yen; and
euro-yen. Similar to the results reported here, they find little relation between
AT and volatility. In contrast to these results, Chaboud et al. (2009) find that
non-algorithmic order flow accounts for most of the variance in FX returns. This
surprising result may be due to either EBS’ origins as an interdealer market where
algorithms were closely monitored, to humans in an interdealer market being more
sophisticated than humans in equity markets, or to there being relatively little pri-
vate information in FX. Chaboud et al. (2009) find that AT seem to follow correlated
strategies, which is consistent with the results of AT clustering together. Hender-
shott, Jones, and Menkveld (2008) use a proxy for AT, message traffic, which is
the sum of order submissions, order cancelations, and trades. Unfortunately, such a
proxy makes it difficult to closely examine when and how AT works and its precise
role in the price formation process. For example, Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld
(2008) use an instrumental variable to show that AT improves liquidity and makes
quotes more informative. The results on AT liquidity supply and demand being
more informed are the natural mechanism by which AT would lead to more infor-
mationally efficient prices.
Any analysis of AT relates to models of liquidity supply and demand.3 Liquidity
3Parlour and Seppi (2008) for a general survey on limit order markets.
CHAPTER 5. ALGORITHMIC TRADING AND INFORMATION 87
supply involves posting firm commitments to trade. These standing orders provide
free-trading options to other traders. Using standard option pricing techniques,
Copeland and Galai (1983) value the cost of the option granted by liquidity suppli-
ers. The arrival of public information can make existing orders stale and can move
the trading option into the money. Foucault, Roe¨ll, and Sandas (2003) study the
equilibrium level of effort which liquidity suppliers should expend in monitoring the
market to avoid this risk. AT enables this kind of monitoring and adjustment of
limit orders in response to public information,4 but AT can also be used by demands
to pick off liquidity suppliers who are not fast enough in adjusting their limit orders
with public information. The monitoring of the state of liquidity in the market –
leading to taking it when cheap and making it when expensive – is entirely consis-
tent with AT playing an important role in the make/take liquidity cycle modeled
expounded by Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel (2008).
AT is also used by traders who are trying to passively accumulate or liquidate
a large position. Bertsimas and Lo (1998) find that the optimal dynamic execution
strategies for such traders involves optimally braking orders into pieces so as to
minimize cost.5 While such execution strategies pre-dated wide-spread adoption of
AT (cf. Keim and Madhavan (1995)), brokers now automate the process with AT
products.
For each component of the larger transaction, a trader (or algorithm) must choose
the type and aggressiveness of the order. Cohen et al. (1981) and Harris (1998) focus
on the simplest static choice: market order versus limit order. If a trader chooses
a non-marketable limit order, the aggressiveness of the order is determined by its
limit price (Griffiths et al. (2000) and Ranaldo (2004)). Lo, MacKinlay, and Zhang
(2002) find that execution times are very sensitive to the choice of limit price. If
limit orders do not execute, traders can cancel them and resubmit them with more
4Rosu (2009) develops a model that implicitly recognizes these technological advances and
simply assumes limit orders can be constantly adjusted.
5Almgren and Chriss (2000) extend this by considering the risk that arises from breaking up
orders and slowly executing them.
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aggressive prices. A short time between submission and cancelation suggests the
presence of AT, and in fact Hasbrouck and Saar (2008) find that a large number of
limit orders are canceled within two seconds on the INET trading platform (which
is now Nasdaq’s trading mechanism).
5.3 Data Matching and Preparation
The data was received directly from the DB and do not include human orders,
i.e. only data from participants in the ATP. To identify human generated trades,
algorithmic trades are matched with the public record of all trades and quotes
provided by SIRCA. All publicly-reported trades that cannot be matched to the
proprietary DB AT data are categorized as human trades. The combined data
include security symbol, price, trade size, execution date and time. The focus is
on the continuous trading phase by removing entries occurring during the opening,
closing, intra-day, and volatility interruption auctions. To ensure a uniform data set
across all analyses, the first fifteen minutes and the final five minutes are removed.
All internalized retail trades are removed due to variable trade reporting lags allowed
by the system6.
AT trades are matched with trades in the SIRCA public data record. The best
(highest bid and lowest ask) AT orders are matched with the SIRCA public order
book. Using the AT order data, AT liquidity demanding trades are identified in the
public data. Liquidity demanding trades are identified by matching the modification
and entry time stamps. The identified AT trades are matched to the SIRCA trade
data using the following criteria:
• Symbol
• Price
• Size
6The Deutsche Boerse offers a trade internalization system for retail orders called Xetra Best
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• Trade Direction
• Time stamp (milliseconds)
Matches between the data sources identify liquidity-demanding trades (AT). Liquidity-
demanding trades match exactly the trade size and price in the public data. The the
trade initiator is identified in the SIRCA public data using the Lee and Ready trade
direction algorithm (Lee and Ready (1991)) with the Bessembinder (2003b) modifi-
cations to determine the trade direction in the public data and use the modification
and execution time stamp in the AT data.
Adjustments are made for an additional lag in the time stamp between the AT
and SIRCA data sets. The publicly-available data is time stamped to the millisecond
but, due to transmission and additional system processing, it lags the system order
data. A time window of up to 500 ms is allowed in the public data when looking
for a match of the remaining criteria. Table 5.1 below, summarizes the lags needed
to match trades by type. The table makes clear that more than 75% of the trades
match in the first 150 ms. The remaining trades match by 500 ms. A typical
observation is that trades that match after more than 250 ms are transacted during
high levels of market activity, which causes a system lag.
Table 5.1: Trade Matching by Type and Lag: This table reports the matches by
lag. When no AT was involved in a trade AT Type is ’No ATP Participation’. Lag is in
milliseconds and is the window between time-stamp in the Deutsche Boerse System Order
data and SIRCA public data used for matching.
Lag (MS) AT % of Total
000-050 324600 25.62%
051-100 390456 30.82%
101-150 270765 21.37%
151-200 130655 10.31%
201-250 76999 6.08%
251-300 58765 4.64%
301-500 14561 1.15%
Total 1266801 100.00%
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Matches of non-marketable orders submitted by algorithms are also made. In
order to perform the information shares analysis (Hasbrouck (1995)) and study the
difference between human and AT spreads, two order books are created. An AT
order book using DB-ATP system order data is re-created using the system order
data. To create a human order book, the SIRCA publicly disseminated order book
is ’subtracted’ from the AT order book. The SIRCA order book is disseminated
with a lag, in this case not more than 250ms. This maximum lag was discovered by
manual inspection of a large number of AT orders and SIRCA order books, especially
around periods of high activity. After the AT order book is created, the best AT
price and quantity is matched with the next order book update after the 250ms lag.
If there were no updates within 500ms, the last update before 250 ms is matched. If
a match is made and the AT price is ’better’ than the posted price, the AT record
is deleted. If the quantity match isn’t exact, the AT quantity is adjusted to the
lowest possible AT quantity. By performing these corrections AT are essentially
handicapped, thereby giving the benefit of the doubt to humans in general.
See the following time line for a visual depiction of the matching process.
ATt−1 → 50
0ms
Humt → 50
100ms
ATob − SIRCAob
250ms
Hum↔ AT
Reported
AT → Hum
Actual
In the above case, an algorithmic trader submits a bid (buy) order at time t− 1. At
time t, 100ms in the future, a human submits an order for the same price 50. At
time t+ 1, 250ms in the future, the AT order book ATob is compared with the next
SIRCA order book SIRCAob. The ATob contains the AT order at time t − 1. The
SIRCAob contains the ATt−1 order and the Humt order. In this scenario AT and
hum orders are reported as occurring simultaneously. Clearly, however, this is not
the case.
If the scenario is reversed i.e. humt−1 and ATt - the SIRCAob is reported for time
t− 1 and the AT order is associated with a SIRCAob at least 250ms in the future,
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and after the order book dissemination from humt−1. In this case, the ordering is
correctly reported as humt−1 and ATt. The above matching scenario ensures that
the most conservative approach to measuring AT information is taken.
5.4 Descriptive Statistics
The data provided by DB contain all AT orders submitted in DAX, the leading
German stock market index composed of the 30 largest and most liquid stocks, for
the 13-day trading period between January 1st and January 18th, 2008. Table 5.2
describe the 30 stocks in the DAX index. Market capitalization is as of December
31st, 2007 in billions of Euros. The smallest firm (TUI AG) is large at 4.81 billion
Euros but is more than 20 times smaller than the largest stock in the sample, Siemens
AG. The standard deviation of daily returns is calculated for each stock during the
sample period. All other variables are calculated daily during the sample period for
each stock (30 stocks for 13 trading days for a total of 390 observations). Means
and standard deviations along with the minimum and maximum values are reported
across the 390 daily observations.
DAX stocks are quite liquid. The average trading volume is 250 million euros per day
with 5,344 trades per day on average. The number of trades per day implies that the
data set contains roughly 2 million transactions (5,344*390). Quoted half-spreads
are calculated when trades occur. The average quoted half-spread of 2.98 basis
points is comparable to large and liquid stocks in other markets (see Hendershott
and Moulton (2007)). The effective spread is the absolute value of the difference
between the transaction price and the mid-quote price (the average of the bid and
ask quotes). Average effective spreads are only slightly larger than quoted spreads,
evidence that market participants seldom submit orders for depth at greater than
the best bid or ask.
Depth is measured in two ways. The first is the standard measure of the depth
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Table 5.2: Summary Statistics: This table presents descriptive statistics for the 30
constituents of the DAX index between January 1st 2008 and January 18th 20008. The
data set combines Deutsche Boerse Automated Trading Program System Order Market
and SIRCA trade, quote and order data. Market Capitalization data is gathered from the
Deutsche Boerse website and cross-checked against data posted directly on the company’s
website and is the closing market capitalization on December 31st, 2007. All reported
value are calculate per stock and day (390 observations) and report the mean, std. dev.,
maximum and minimum of these.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Mkt. Cap. (Euro Billion) 32.85 26.03 4.81 99.45
Price (Euros) 67.85 42.28 6.45 155.15
Std. Dev of Daily Return (%) 3.12 1.40 1.47 9.29
Daily Trading Volume (Euro Million) 250 217 23 1,509
Daily Number of Trades per Day 5,344 3,003 1,292 19,252
Trade Size (Euro) 40,893 15,808 14,944 121,710
Quoted Spread (bps) 2.98 3.01 1.24 9.86
Effective Spread (bps) 3.49 3.05 1.33 10.05
Depth (Euro 10 Million) 0.0177 0.0207 0.0044 0.1522
Depth3 (Euro 10 Million) 0.1012 0.1545 0.0198 1.0689
at the inside quote: the average depth in euros at the best bid price and the best
ask price. As with spreads, depth is measured at the time of transaction. More
depth allows traders to execute larger trades without impacting the price, which
corresponds to higher liquidity. However, if the width of the spread varies over
time, then comparisons of depth at the inside do not clearly correspond to levels
of liquidity, e.g., 50,000 euros at a 20 basis point spread need not represent more
liquidity than 5,000 euros at a 5 basis point spread if in the latter case there is
additional depth between 5,000 and 50,000 euros. To account for time variation in
the spread, a second depth measure is calculated using the limit order book. For
each stock, the depth at bid and ask prices is aggregated that have a distance of less
than three times that stock’s average quoted half-spread from the midpount at the
time of transaction. This measure of depth, which does not depend on the spread
at the time of the transaction, is referred to as depth3. A similar measure was used
in Foucault and Menkveld (2008) to capture depth away from the best.
CHAPTER 5. ALGORITHMIC TRADING AND INFORMATION 93
5.5 AT Liquidity Demand
To measure AT liquidity demand, an AT trade-initiation variable AT and a human
trade-initiation variable Hum are created. The AT variable takes the value 1 when
a trade is initiated by an algorithmic trader, and 0 otherwise. The Hum variable
takes the value 1 when a trade is initiated by a human and 0 otherwise. Panel A of
Table 5.3 reports the fraction of euro trading volume for AT trades by trade size and
overall.7 Overall, AT initiate 52% of euro volume and more than 60% of all trades.
AT initiation declines with trade size. AT is greater than 68% and 57% in the two
smallest trade size categories (0-499 shares and 500-999 shares) and decreases to
23% in the largest trade size category (10,000+ shares). AT’s decline with trade
size is consistent with AT being used to breakup large orders into smaller trades as
suggested by Bertsimas and Lo (1998).
To better understand the nature of AT and human liquidity demand, a series of
analyses are performed, similar to those found in Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995).
The results of the two separate and related analyses can be found in Table 5.4.
Given the fraction of AT and human trades, the first column of Panel A of Table 5.4
(labeled Unconditional) provides the fraction of trades sequences, i.e., AT followed
by AT, AT followed by human, etc., one would expect if AT and human trades were
randomly ordered. The other columns in Panel A are essentially a contingency table
documenting the probability of observing a trade of a specific type after observing
a previous trade with a given type. All rows sum to 100% and can be interpreted
as probability vectors.
7For simplicity and comparability the U.S. SEC Rule 605, trade size categories based on the
number of shares traded is used.
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Table 5.3: Trade Breakdown by Trade Size Category: AT is equal to one if a trade
is initiated by an AT and zero otherwise. Hum is equal to one if a trade is initiated by a
human and zero otherwise. Panel A reports volume weighted participation in 5 SEC trade
size categories. Panel B reports the similar breakdown in percentage of total order flow
by AT and humans.
Panel A Trade Breakdown Participant
Trade-size Categories AT HUM All
0 - 499 68% 32% 21%
500 -999 57% 43% 43%
1,000 - 4,999 42% 58% 21%
5,000 - 9,999 30% 70% 7%
10,000 + 23% 77% 8%
All 52% 48% 100%
Panel B by Trade Size Only
Trade-size Categories Volume AT
%Tot
HUM
%Tot
AT
%Self
HUM
%Self
0 - 499 21.42% 14.6% 6.8% 28.2% 14.1%
500 -999 42.98% 24.6% 18.4% 47.5% 38.2%
1,000 - 4,999 20.64% 8.7% 11.9% 16.8% 24.8%
5,000 - 9,999 7.41% 2.2% 5.2% 4.2% 10.8%
10,000 + 7.56% 1.7% 5.9% 3.3% 12.2%
All 100.00% 51.9% 48.1% 100.0% 100.0%
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The first column and row of Panel A in Table 5.4 shows that if AT and human
trades were randomly ordered, 37.03% of the transactions would be AT followed by
AT, while in the data this occurs 40.73% of the time. The results show that AT
trades are more likely than expected to follow AT trades and that AT trades are
more likely to be repeated on the same side of the market. The same is not true for
human trades. This suggests that the human and AT liquidity demanding trading
strategies differ.
Panel B breaks the data down into AT and humans trade by trade size category.
As in Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995), the three largest values in a column are
highlighted in bold. The results attained are similar to the diagonal results reported
in Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995) and predicted theoretically in Parlour (1998).
The diagonal finding implies that trades of the same type – AT or human trades in
the same trade size category – follow other similar trades. This is illustrated in the
data, wherein the highest probabilities lie on the diagonal. The largest probability
by far is for small AT trades: the AT 1t−1AT
1
t probability of 48.70% is much higher
than the unconditional probability of 31.62%. This suggests that AT are repeatedly
using small trades to hide their information or limit their transitory price impact,
or that multiple AT are following related strategies. Panel B also shows that AT
seem to be sensitive to human order flow whereas humans are relatively insensitive
to AT order flow.
Table 5.5 reports the probability of observing an AT or human trade conditional
on the spread of the previous trade. The quoted spread quartiles are calculated
using the time series average of each stock. AT are more likely to submit a liquidity
demanding trade after observing a small spread on a previous trade. The difference
between the unconditional probability and conditional probability is statistically
significant at the 1% level. From a statistical viewpoint, humans are significantly
less likely to submit a liquidity demand trade after directly observing a trade with
a small spread.
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It is plausible that humans react similarly to previous trades, but with a delay.
The results are similar for the conditional probability of observing an algorithmic
or human trade after a small or large previous time interval. AT are more likely
to submit trades directly following small previous time intervals. The difference is
statistically significant but has little practical impact.
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 provide trading frequencies based on prior trades and spreads,
but is not informative on how closely together those events cluster. Table 5.6 reports
the average time between trades dependent on past trades and spreads. As in Biais,
Hillion, and Spatt (1995), spreads are calculated for each stock, and categories (e.g.,
large spread) are determined relative to averages/percentiles for that stock. For
example, large spread represents trades in a stock that occur when spreads are in
their widest quartile for that stock.
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The most interesting results in Table 5.6 are in Panel C. When spreads narrow,
the time until the next AT trade shrinks significantly from 9.03 seconds for large
spread to 4.67 seconds for small spreads. While humans also respond more quickly
to smaller spreads, the difference between large spread (11.43 seconds) and small
spreads (9.09 seconds) is 2.34 seconds for humans versus 4.36 seconds for AT. The
difference-in-differences of 2.02 seconds between AT large-spread minus AT small-
spread and human large-spread minus human small-spread is statistically significant.
This is further evidence that AT actively monitor the market for liquidity.
Thus far, AT and human sensitivity to past trades and spreads have been an-
alyzed. Next, AT and human trading are investigated, taking into account con-
temporaneous and lagged liquidity measures. Following Barclay, Hendershott, and
McCormick (2003a), similar liquidity variables are used and summarized in Table
5.2, including past return volatility and trading volume. Lagged volatility is the ab-
solute value of the stock return over the 15 minutes prior to the transaction. Lagged
volume is the euro trading volume in the 15 minutes prior to the transaction.
The correlation between the various measures of depth and liquidity and the AT
activity variable and are presented in Table 5.7.
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AT activity correlates negatively and significantly with quoted and effective spreads.
This is first evidence that AT is sensitive to liquidity variables. The hypothesis is
tested in a more in-depth and robust probit analysis below.
Table 5.8 reports coefficient estimates from probit regressions for AT initiated
trades along with their corresponding linear probability slopes and chi-square statis-
tics. To control for stock effects and time of day effects, firm dummy variables (30)
and 17 time-of-day dummy variables one for each half-hour period, are included
but not reported. The only significant time-of-day effects are that AT becomes less
likely at the end of the trading day, primarily in the last half hour of continuous trad-
ing. All 2, 085, 233 observations (each trade in the data set) are used. A chi-square
statistic of more than 3.84 represents statistical significant at the 5% level.
The probit results generally show that AT is more likely to trade when spreads are
narrow and when trading volume over the prior 15 minutes is low. As in Panel A of
Table 5.3, larger trades are less likely to be initiated by AT. Volatility over the prior
15 minutes is unrelated to AT . Once market conditions are controlled for, depth at
the inside is unrelated to AT . Depth measured independently of the inside spread
(depth3) is positively related to AT . The positive relation between AT initiation and
liquidity and the zero relation between AT initiation and lagged volatility provide
no evidence to support the contention that AT exacerbates volatility.
As with the spread results in the time until the next transaction analysis in
Table 5.6, the depth and spread results establish that AT are more likely to initiate
trades when liquidity is high. AT closely monitoring the book could bring about
this result for two reasons. First, AT could time their liquidity demand for periods
when liquidity is cheap, as in the Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel (2008) make/take
liquidity cycle. When liquidity is expensive, algorithms simply wait until more
liquidity is available before initiating a trade. A variant on this is that when liquidity
is expensive, algorithms attempt to capture rather than pay the spread by switching
from demanding liquidity to supplying liquidity, which is explored in Section 5.7.
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Table 5.8: Probit Regression AT: The dependent variable is equal to one if the trade
is initiated by an AT and zero otherwise. Trade size is the euro volume of a trade divided
by 100,000. Depth is the depth (price * shares) at the bid + the depth at the ask. Depth3
is the depth at three times the average quoted spread on the bid side + depth at three
times the average spread on the ask side. Lagged volatility is the absolute value of the
stock return over the past 15-minutes. Lagged volume is the sum of the volume over
the past 15-minutes. Firm fixed effects dummies and dummies for each half-hour of the
trading day are not reported.
Variable Model A Model A1
Quoted Spread -0.016 -0.016
– Probability Slope -0.006 -0.006
– Chi-square 5324 5420
– Robust t-stat -9.77 -10.37
Trade Size -0.20 -0.20
– Probability Slope -0.08 -0.08
– Chi-square 19645 19275
– Robust t-stat -23.22 -22.74
Depth - -0.04
– Probability Slope - -0.01
–Chi-square - 1.14
– Robust t-stat - -0.28
Depth3 0.10 -
– Probability Slope 0.04 -
–Chi-square 69 -
– Robust t-stat 0.91 -
Lagged Volatility -0.648 0.161
– Probability Slope -0.250 0.062
– Chi-square 0.07 0.00
– Robust t-stat -0.04 0.01
Lagged Volume -0.040 -0.030
– Probability Slope -0.016 -0.012
– Chi-square 30.176 17.030
– Robust t-stat -0.33 -0.14
Observations 2,085,233 2,085,233
The results suggest that AT monitor the market for liquidity and consume liq-
uidity when it is cheap. This suggests that AT helps smooth out liquidity over
time. When humans are more willing to supply liquidity, AT increase their liquidity
demand. This, together with AT having no relationship to past volatility, suggests
that AT is more likely to dampen than to increase volatility.
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5.6 AT Liquidity Demand and Price Discovery
Having established that AT liquidity demand relates to liquidity dynamics, the
dynamics between AT and returns is further examined. Just as AT monitor the
market for variation in liquidity, AT may be able to process and act on information
before humans can. This is examined by estimating the information content of AT
and human events using Hasbrouck (1991a) and Hasbrouck (1991b) VARs.
5.6.1 Information Content of AT
To measure the information content of AT and human events, the permanent price
impact of AT and human trading is calculated. Several papers have addressed re-
lated questions in multi-market settings; see for example Huang (2002) and Barclay,
Hendershott, and McCormick (2003a) for quoting and trading on electronic com-
munications networks and Nasdaq. In settings with multiple markets, variation in
time stamps across markets make it difficult to ensure the proper ordering of events.
In addition, if time stamps are only reported in seconds, trades and quote changes
may occur contemporaneously. The data herein avoid these potential issues because
trading is all within the DB Xetra system and time stamps are reported down to
the millisecond. Therefore, the model is estimated on a event-by-event basis using
10 events in the future for AT and humans alike. The model is estimated for each
stock for each day. Statistical inference is therefore performed using the 30 stocks *
13 days = 390 observations.
As in Barclay, Hendershott, and McCormick (2003a), three equations are esti-
mated: a mid-point return (quote) equation; an AT trade equation; and a human
trade equation. An event that is a trade or quote change is indexed using t as the
time scale, qat is defined as the signed (+1 for a buy, -1 for a sell) AT trades and
qhuman as the signed human trades. The quote midpoint is rt and is defined as the
quote midpoint to quote midpoint return between trades or quote changes. The
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VAR using 10 events is as follows:
rt =
10∑
i=1
αirt−i +
10∑
i=0
βiq
at
t−i +
10∑
i=0
γiq
human
t−i + 1,t, (5.1)
qatt =
10∑
i=1
δirt−i +
10∑
i=1
ρiq
at
t−i +
10∑
i=1
ζiq
human
t−i + 2,t, (5.2)
qhumant =
10∑
i=1
piirt−i +
10∑
i=1
υiq
at
t−i +
10∑
i=1
ψiq
human
t−i + 3,t, (5.3)
Each day the trading process restarts and all lagged values are set to zero. By
estimating an event-by-event VAR, it is ensured that there is no correlation between
qatt and q
human
t . After estimating the VAR model, Hasbrouck (1991a) and Hasbrouck
(1991b) is followed and the VAR is inverted to get the vector moving average (VMA)
model:

rt
qatt
qhumant
 =

a(L) b(L) c(L)
d(L) e(L) f(L)
g(L) h(L) i(L)


1,t
2,t
3,t
 ,
where a(L)−i(L) are the lagged polynomial operators. Following Hasbrouck (1991a),
the impulse response function for AT is
∑10
t=0 b(L) and can be interpreted as the pri-
vate information content of an innovation in AT. Similarly, the impulse response
function for humans is
∑10
t=0 c(L). The impulse response functions provide an esti-
mate of the permanent price impact of a trade innovation (the unexpected portion
of a trade).
Table 5.9 reports the results of the impulse response function for 10 events into
the future. The VAR is also estimated out to 100 events and no qualitatively different
results are found. Table 5.9 reports impulse response functions for each of the 30
stocks and the average impulse response function across stocks. For each stock, the
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statistical significance of the impulse response function is estimated for AT and for
human trading for the 13 trading days using Newey-West standard errors. AT has a
greater permanent price impact for 28 of the 30 stocks and for 23 of those, the AT-
human difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. The average permanent
price impact for AT is 0.53 basis points versus 0.44 basis points for human trades.
The statistical significance of this 0.09 overall difference is estimated between AT
and human trades by double clustering standard errors on stock and trading day
(Thompson (2006) and Petersen (2009)). In summary, an innovation in AT trading
leads to a more than 20% greater permanent price change than an innovation in
human trading.
Figure 5.1 graphs the overall average (across stock days) of the cumulative impulse
response function of a positive (buy order) one standard deviation shock to AT and
human order flow from the immediate response to 10 events in the future. The initial
impact of an AT trade innovation is greater than for humans and the impact of AT
versus humans trades increases over the subsequent 10 events. It can be seen that
the impulse response function is becoming flat by the tenth event. Figure 5.1 shows
that the price response to AT order flow is immediately greater than the response
to human order flow.
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Table 5.9: Average Long Run Impulse Response by Stock: This table reports
the long-run (10 lag) impulse response function for AT and humans. The AT (Human)
participation variable is equal to the trade direction (-1, 0, +1) multiplied by 1 if a trade
is an AT (Human) initiated trade and zero otherwise. The reported mean is the mean
difference between AT and Human impulse responses. The reported t-stat is calculated
using Newey-West standard errors which are robust to autocorrelation across daily obser-
vations. Overall reports the mean of AT and human impulse response, in the AT-Mean
column the average difference between AT and human impulse response functions is re-
ported. A double-clustering technique is used on time and stock to calculate standard
errors (Thompson, 2006).
Stock AT Human AT-Human t-stat
ADS 0.46 0.46 -0.01 -0.28
ALV 0.23 0.15 0.07 5.28
BAS 0.25 0.16 0.09 9.65
BAY 0.47 0.35 0.12 12.30
BMW 0.49 0.45 0.04 1.39
CBK 0.75 0.59 0.16 3.30
CON 0.51 0.39 0.12 5.16
DAI 0.36 0.28 0.09 4.33
DB1 0.46 0.39 0.07 6.62
DBK 0.30 0.25 0.05 2.12
DPB 0.52 0.40 0.12 3.90
DPW 0.57 0.56 0.01 0.22
DTE 0.96 0.82 0.14 1.57
EON 0.26 0.18 0.08 5.44
FME 0.52 0.45 0.08 1.51
HNK 0.61 0.49 0.12 2.08
HRX 0.76 0.74 0.02 0.33
IFX 1.42 1.25 0.17 1.18
LHA 0.84 0.68 0.16 2.99
LIN 0.33 0.36 -0.03 -1.59
MAN 0.49 0.36 0.12 3.50
MEO 0.55 0.39 0.16 3.99
MRC 0.54 0.43 0.11 3.40
MUV 0.29 0.20 0.10 3.58
RWE 0.35 0.23 0.12 3.65
SAP 0.43 0.31 0.11 2.92
SIE 0.25 0.20 0.06 2.43
TKA 0.58 0.40 0.18 5.88
TUI 1.17 0.90 0.26 4.63
VOW 0.31 0.22 0.09 8.99
Overall 0.53 0.44 0.09 8.71
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The 95% confidence intervals in Figure 5.1 show that the larger immediate impact
of AT is statistically significant. To calculate whether the lagged adjustment to AT
is also greater, the difference between the long-run (LR; 10 event forecast horizon)
and short-run (SR; immediate) impulse response functions is reported in Table 5.10.
As in Table 5.9, the estimates for AT, humans, and the AT-human difference is
reported for each stock and overall. The lagged adjustment (LR-SR) is smaller than
the immediate response to trading for both AT and human trades. The LR-SR
impulse response is greater for AT than for humans in 24 stocks. Seventeen of
the AT estimates are statistically significantly greater than those for humans and
in no stock is there statistical evidence that human trading has a larger impulse
response function than does AT. The impulse response results provide evidence
that individual innovations in AT have more private information than do human
trades. This difference is persistent and increases beyond the immediate impact of
the trade. If AT contributed to transitory volatility, the long-run impulse response
function would be lower than the short-run impulse response function. The evidence
is more consistent with AT playing an important role in the efficient price formation
process.
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Table 5.10: Long Run - Short Run Impulse Response: This table reports the long-
run minus the short-run impulse response function for AT and human initiated trades, the
difference between AT and human and the statistical significance of the difference. AT is
the long-run (10 lag) impulse response minus the short-run (1 lag) impulse response for
AT initiated trades, human is the long run (10 lag) impulse response minus the short run
(1 lag) impulse response for human initiated trades. AT-Human is the difference between
AT and Human impulse response functions. The t-stat is calculated using Newey-West
standard errors which are robust to autocorrelation across daily observations. Overall
reports the mean difference between the AT and human impulse responses. A double-
clustering technique is used on time and stock to calculate standard errors (Thompson,
2006).
Stock AT Human AT-Human t-stat
ADS 0.20 0.22 -0.02 -0.59
ALV 0.09 0.06 0.03 2.25
BAS 0.13 0.07 0.05 8.22
BAY 0.22 0.16 0.06 4.57
BMW 0.23 0.24 -0.01 -0.95
CBK 0.26 0.21 0.04 0.71
CON 0.27 0.21 0.06 5.25
DAI 0.14 0.09 0.04 2.52
DB1 0.21 0.18 0.03 4.38
DBK 0.13 0.11 0.02 0.98
DPB 0.24 0.16 0.08 4.25
DPW 0.16 0.21 -0.05 -1.51
DTE 0.00 0.10 -0.10 -1.26
EON 0.13 0.08 0.04 3.66
FME 0.21 0.17 0.04 0.94
HNK 0.24 0.19 0.05 1.08
HRX 0.31 0.36 -0.05 -1.17
IFX 0.01 0.15 -0.14 -1.16
LHA 0.27 0.22 0.05 0.85
LIN 0.17 0.20 -0.03 -1.39
MAN 0.25 0.20 0.05 1.96
MEO 0.26 0.19 0.07 2.83
MRC 0.28 0.23 0.05 2.33
MUV 0.13 0.09 0.04 2.23
RWE 0.17 0.11 0.06 2.59
SAP 0.13 0.07 0.06 3.75
SIE 0.12 0.10 0.03 1.38
TKA 0.23 0.16 0.07 3.56
TUI 0.41 0.39 0.02 0.98
VOW 0.15 0.10 0.05 5.00
Overall 0.19 0.17 0.02 2.76
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5.6.2 Aggregate Amount of Information in AT
The impulse response functions reported above provides evidence that innovations
in AT have a significant impact on prices, but do not characterize how important
the role of AT and human trading are in the overall price formation process. To
do this, Hasbrouck (1991b) is followed in order to decompose the variance of the
efficient price into the portion of total price discovery that is correlated with AT
versus human trades. Doing this first requires decomposing the midpoint return rt
into its random walk mt and stationary components st:
rt = mt + st (5.4)
mt is referred to as the efficient price where mt = mt−1 + wt and Ewt = 0; st is the
transitory component. Using the previous VMA notation and defining σ21 = E
2
1,t,
σ22 = E
2
2,t, and σ
2
3
= E23,t, the variance of the efficient price is decomposed into
trade-correlated and trade-uncorrelated changes.
σ2w =
(
10∑
i=0
ai
)2
σ21 +
(
10∑
i=0
bi
)2
σ22 +
(
10∑
i=0
ci
)2
σ23 (5.5)
The second and third terms represent the proportion of the efficient price variance
attributable to AT and humans, respectively. The first term is the public information
(non-trade correlated) portion of price discovery.8
Table 5.11 reports the variance decompositions results. As in the previous anal-
yses, the average by stock and overall is reported. In 27 of the 30 stocks, AT
has a greater contribution to price discovery and in 21 of those stocks, the AT-
human difference is statistically significant. In no stock is the human contribution
to price discovery statistically significantly greater than that of AT. On average, AT
8Because each trade is initiated either by AT or by humans, the correlation in the trade equation
residuals, 2,t and 3,t, is zero. Because the contemporaneous trade variables are included in the
return equation, the correlation of the residuals from the trade equations are uncorrelated with
the residuals from the return equation. Therefore, the residual covariance terms in the variance
decomposition are not included.
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contributes 39% more to price discovery than do humans. The larger percentage
difference between AT and humans for the variance decomposition as compared to
the impulse response functions implies that the innovations in AT order flow are
greater than are the innovations in human order flow. This is consistent with AT
being able to disguise their trading intentions.
For brevity, the short-run (immediate) variance decomposition for AT and hu-
man trades is calculated but not reported. The results for the short-run variance
decomposition are similar to those for the short-run impulse response functions in
the previous section. Roughly half of the variance explained by AT and human
trades is reflected immediately.
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Table 5.11: Long Run - Variance Decomposition: This table reports the relative
contribution of AT and human initiated trades, the contribution of non-trade related trade
(r), the difference in contribution between AT and humans and the statistical significance
of the difference. AT is the percentage of variance explained by AT initiated trades, human
is the percentage of variation explained by human initiated trades, r is the percentage of
variance explained by mid-point returns, the trade uncorrelated portion. AT-Human is
the average difference in stock price variation explained by AT and humans. The t-stats
is calculated using Newey-West standard errors which are robust to autocorrelation across
across daily observations by stock. A double-clustering technique is used on time and
stock to calculate standard errors for the overall difference (Thompson, 2006).
Stock AT Human Return AT-Human t-stat
ADS 4.01% 4.50% 91.49% -0.49% -1.3
ALV 3.81% 2.01% 94.18% 1.80% 4.85
BAS 4.18% 1.81% 94.01% 2.37% 9.66
BAY 6.08% 3.69% 90.23% 2.39% 8.98
BMW 4.05% 3.95% 92.01% 0.10% 0.20
CBK 6.24% 4.06% 89.70% 2.18% 2.83
CON 5.23% 3.32% 91.45% 1.92% 4.88
DAI 4.23% 2.76% 93.01% 1.47% 3.15
DB1 6.05% 4.83% 89.12% 1.21% 4.45
DBK 4.29% 3.25% 92.46% 1.04% 1.93
DPB 4.10% 2.68% 93.23% 1.42% 2.56
DPW 4.54% 4.64% 90.82% -0.0% -0.15
DTE 12.71% 10.15% 77.13% 2.56% 1.03
EON 4.73% 2.51% 92.77% 2.22% 4.98
FME 5.06% 3.83% 91.11% 1.22% 1.35
HNKp 5.60% 4.70% 89.70% 0.90% 1.09
HRX 5.77% 5.42% 88.81% 0.35% 0.4
IFX 5.73% 5.67% 88.61% 0.06% 0.04
LHA 6.42% 4.52% 89.06% 1.90% 2.76
LIN 3.21% 4.01% 92.78% -0.80% -2.42
MAN 4.90% 3.01% 92.09% 1.89% 2.70
MEO 5.88% 3.31% 90.81% 2.57% 3.17
MRC 5.63% 4.11% 90.25% 1.52% 2.38
MUV 5.49% 2.89% 91.62% 2.59% 3.85
RWE 5.15% 2.56% 92.29% 2.59% 3.17
SAP 4.69% 2.76% 92.55% 1.94% 2.46
SIE 3.88% 2.76% 93.36% 1.13% 1.88
TKA 6.07% 3.28% 90.65% 2.79% 4.52
TUI 7.12% 4.93% 87.95% 2.19% 3.67
VOW 5.94% 3.24% 90.83% 2.70% 5.68
Overall 5.36% 3.84% 90.80% 1.52 % 8.01
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5.7 AT Liquidity Supply and Price Discovery
The previous sections analyze AT-demanding liquidity and the role it plays in the
price discovery process. Unfortunately, while the data from DB contains all trans-
action where AT supply liquidity, only 90% of these transaction can be identified
unambiguously in the public transaction record.9 This is due to the frequency of
trading, the fact that the time stamps on the AT trades and overall trades are
not identical, and because knowing the size of a non-marketable AT order does not
uniquely identify the size of the total transaction. For example, if a non-marketable
AT order of 100 shares is executed, the total trade size could be anything above 100
shares. There are often several possible trades that occur at times within plausible
differences between the public transaction record and the AT transaction record.10
Comparing the volume of executed non-marketable AT orders with the total trading
volume shows that AT supply liquidity on 50% of trading volume.
While unable to make an exact match with AT liquidity supplying trades in the
SIRCA public order book, an AT order book can be built and matched with the
public order book. To understand how AT supply liquidity, two order books are built
(see the Chapter 3 for further details). One AT order book is built that contains the
best prices and sizes of AT orders and is then compared with the SIRCA full order
book. The depth in the full SIRCA order book that is not found in the AT order
book is the human order book. The inside bid and ask quotes is stored for the AT
and humans. If there is any doubt, each step in the matching procedure assumes
human quote updates occur before AT quote updates.
Whether or not AT are more likely to supply liquidity at the best quote is
examined first. This provides initial evidence on whether or not AT are competitive
9Analysis on the transactions unambiguously identified as AT-liquidity-supplying supports the
main findings in this section that AT supply liquidity when it is expensive and AT are less likely
to trade against private information.
10Multiple feasible matches for AT transactions also occur for liquidity demanding trades. How-
ever, when AT initiates a trade, size is uniquely identified. This only occurs in 0.1% of the AT
liquidity-demanding trades as opposed to 10% of the AT liquidity-supplying trades.
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in quoting the best prices for marketable orders to trade with. Table 5.12 examines
the amount of time AT and humans are at the inside bid and ask. This combines
the times when AT and humans are alone at the inside and when they are both at
the inside together. A positive number indicates that an algorithmic trader was at
the best alone for longer than was the human trader, whereas the reverse is true if
the value is negative.
Table 5.12 shows that AT are at the inside more often in 24 of the 30 DAX stocks,
with the difference being statistically significant in 21 of the 24 stocks. On average,
AT are at the inside almost 1 hour more per day than are humans, and that difference
is statistically significant. Table 5.12 also examines whether or not AT are more
likely to be present at the inside when spreads are wide or narrow. As in Table
5.6, times when spreads are wider and narrower than average for that stock are
identified. The amount time during the high- and low-spread times that AT and
humans are on the inside is calculated. Table 5.12 shows that AT are at the inside
more often during both high- and low-spread periods, but the AT-human difference
is significantly higher during the high-spread periods. This shows that AT are more
likely to provide liquidity when liquidity is expensive. This is consistent with AT
attempting to capture liquidity supply profits in the Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel
(2008) make/take liquidity cycle.
The previous analysis of the amount of time AT and humans spend at the best
bid or ask addresses the questions of how long and when each supply liquidity
at the best. The analysis does not address the question of whether, on average,
AT or humans supply tighter quotes. Table 5.13 reports the results of an analysis
examining the average bid and ask quotes submitted by AT and humans.
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Table 5.12: Time at Best: This table reports the number of seconds an AT is at the
best - minus the number of seconds a human is at the best. The remainder of time both
AT and humans are at the best. The first column reports the AT - Human time at best.
T-stats are calculated using Newey-West standard errors for each stock and Thompson
(2006) standard errors for the entire panel. The Q1 AT - Human column reports the
average AT - Human time at best when spreads are below their per stock time series
average. The Q2 AT - Human column reports the average AT - Human time at best
when spreads are above their time series per stock average. Q1 - Q2 reports the difference
between time at best below the time series quoted spread average - time at best above the
time series quoted spread average.
Q1 Q2
Stock AT - Human t-stat AT - Human AT - Human Q1 - Q2 t-stat
ADS 4,235 3.91 1,454 2,780 -1,326 -2.35
ALV -3,000 -2.94 -2,368 -632 -1,735 -2.67
BAS 1,011 1.41 -492 1,503 -1,995 -6.07
BAY 3,136 6.44 718 2,418 -1,700 -10.58
BMW 6,321 4.31 2,612 3,708 -1,095 -1.83
CBK 4,706 2.95 2,996 1,709 1,287 2.1
CON 1,249 0.96 -739 1,988 -2,727 -8.01
DAI -3,893 -2.27 -3,508 -385 -3,122 -14.16
DB1 2,739 4.94 132 2,607 -2,475 -2.88
DBK -3,395 -8.58 -3,254 -141 -3,112 -8.51
DPB 7,115 7.83 2,187 4,927 -2,740 -6
DPW 4,555 4.76 2,789 1,765 1,024 2.83
DTE -2,461 -3.56 -2,087 -374 -1,713 -3.9
EON 1,479 2.29 -301 1,780 -2,081 -5.59
FME 11,850 11.64 5,361 6,489 -1,128 -0.75
HNK 7,494 10.04 4,054 3,439 615 0.58
HRX 1,028 0.54 -722 1,751 -2,474 -5.04
IFX -201 -0.22 -287 85 -372 -0.95
LHA 4,056 2.45 3,215 840 2,375 1.9
LIN 7,219 12.42 2,727 4,492 -1,764 -4.03
MAN 4,712 9.18 1,297 3,415 -2,117 -6.42
MEO 6,843 3.93 3,258 3,585 -326 -0.53
MRC 9,155 9.8 3,348 5,806 -2,457 -5.3
MUV 6,959 8.94 2,492 4,466 -1,974 -2.58
RWE 3,551 6.13 874 2,676 -1,802 -2.69
SAP 3,715 6.1 656 3,059 -2,402 -6.78
SIE -1,911 -2.48 -2,612 701 -3,313 -11.73
TKA 4,238 14.51 883 3,354 -2,470 -6.35
TUI 5,885 5.26 4,082 1,802 2,279 3.16
VOW 2,415 2.27 -42 2,458 -2,500 -3.12
Overall 3,360 7.00 958 2,403 -1445 -7.21
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Table 5.13: Full - AT - Human Spread: This table reports the average spread,
average AT spread and average human spread. AT-Human is the difference between AT
and human spread. The t-stat is calculated using Newey-West standard errors at the
individual stock level. A double clustering technique is used on time and firm to calculate
standard errors for the entire panel Thompson (2006) .
Stock Full Spread AT Spread Human Spread AT-Human t-stat
ADS 3.51 4.46 4.89 -0.42 -2.68
ALV 1.49 2.37 1.96 0.41 6.23
BAS 1.76 2.49 2.38 0.11 1.46
BAY 2.29 3.02 3.17 -0.15 -4.50
BMW 2.76 3.71 4.26 -0.54 -3.07
CBK 4.05 5.25 5.77 -0.52 -1.96
CON 3.31 4.46 4.24 0.23 1.58
DAI 2.49 3.69 3.18 0.51 4.10
DB1 3.24 4.45 4.19 0.26 4.59
DBK 1.82 2.76 2.37 0.39 17.02
DPB 4.26 5.59 6.05 -0.45 -3.03
DPW 3.66 4.48 5.14 -0.66 -4.55
DTE 3.59 4.30 4.00 0.29 3.16
EON 1.58 2.23 2.12 0.11 3.38
FME 3.67 4.36 5.77 -1.41 -8.38
HNK 4.23 5.21 6.25 -1.06 -6.52
HRX 5.27 7.02 7.00 0.02 0.02
IFX 8.26 9.60 9.91 -0.31 -1.63
LHA 4.71 5.82 6.56 -0.75 -2.34
LIN 2.91 3.76 3.99 -0.22 -4.72
MAN 3.98 5.05 5.06 -0.01 -0.33
MEO 3.07 3.84 4.42 -0.58 -2.94
MRC 4.24 5.21 5.85 -0.64 -4.97
MUV 1.74 2.30 2.43 -0.13 -3.51
RWE 1.96 2.68 2.70 -0.03 -0.49
SAP 2.64 3.53 3.91 -0.38 -5.89
SIE 1.77 2.67 2.33 0.34 6.47
TKA 3.31 4.34 4.68 -0.34 -5.89
TUI 5.09 6.21 7.56 -1.35 -7.54
VOW 2.11 2.88 2.73 0.15 1.88
Overall 3.29 4.26 4.50 -0.24 -3.67
The results confirm the results of the time at best analysis and confirm that
AT submit tighter spreads than humans and contribute positively to liquidity. The
average difference between AT and human spreads is statistically significantly lower
for 15 of 30 stocks and for the panel as a whole. Humans submit significantly tighter
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spreads in only seven of 30 stocks.
For AT to be on the inside more often yet only provide liquidity for for 50% of
volume, AT orders must be smaller or times when humans are alone at the inside
are more likely to have transactions. One natural explanation for trades occurring
more often when humans are alone at the inside quote is that the human quotes
are stale and are adversely picked off. By examining how much the AT and human
quotes contribute to the price discover process we can show that AT and human
quotes are different and that AT quotes better reflect the efficient price. If AT
quotes contribute more to the price discovery process, human quotes may appear
inaccurate and stale.
5.7.1 Hasbrouck Information Shares
To examine AT and human quotes in the price discovery process, the Informa-
tion Shares (IS) approach pioneered by Hasbrouck (1995) is used. Typically this
approach is used to determine which of several markets contributes more to price
discovery. This approach has been used in the literature to compare spot and deriva-
tives markets (e.g., Tse (1999) and Chan, Chung, and Fong (2002)) and multiple
stocks market (Hasbrouck (1995), Huang (2002), Barclay, Hendershott, and Mc-
Cormick (2003a), and others). Because the information share has been widely used,
only some of the technical details are provided. The econometric approach assumes
that AT and human quotes form a common efficient price process. The informa-
tion share attributable to AT and human quotes is the relative contribution of the
innovations of each to the innovation in the common efficient price. The general
convention is to equate the proportional information share to price discovery.
Because AT and human quotes are for the same stock, arbitrage requires that
the two price series be co-integrated. The AT mid-point is calculated as MPATt =
(BestBidATt +BestAsk
AT
t )/2 and the midpoint for humans is calculated in the same
manner. The midquotes are assumed covariance stationary. The information share
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of a participant is measured as that participants contribution to the total variance
of the common (random-walk) component. To formalize, denote a price vector pt
that represents the prevailing mid-quote for AT as pATt = mt + 
AT
t and humans as
pHumt = mt + 
Hum
t . mt, the common efficient price is assumed to follow a random
walk:
mt = mt−1 + ut, (5.6)
where E(ut) = 0, E(u
2t) = σ2u, and E(utus) = 0 for t 6= s. The price vector can be
represented using a VMA model.
∆pt = t + ψ1t−1 + ψ2t−2..., (5.7)
Where  is a 2 X 1 vector of innovations with a zero mean and a variance matrix of
Ω; t = [
AT
t , 
Hum
t ] where 
AT
t reflects the innovations (information) attributable to
AT and Humt that to humans. The variance of the random walk component is then:
σ2u = ΨΩΨ
′ (5.8)
where Ω = V ar(t) and Ψ is a polynomial in the lag operator. Expanding the above
equation yields:
σ2u = [Ψ
AT ,ΨHum]
 σ2at σat,hum
σhum,at σ
2
hum

 ΨAT
ΨHum
 .
If the covariance matrix is diagonal, then the random-walk variance attributable
to AT and to humans can be perfectly identified. If the record of the public limit
order book was updated every time an order arrived, there should be no contem-
poraneous correlation between AT and human quote changes. However, it appears
that at times the public order book dissemination contains multiple updates. Thus
the off-diagonal terms are not zero, and Hasbrouck (1995) is followed to construct
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upper and lower bounds for the information shares of AT and human quotes. The
upper bound for AT corresponds to the assumption that all of the contemporaneous
correlation between AT and human quote changes is attributable to AT, whereas the
lower bound for AT assumes the contemporaneous correlation between AT and hu-
man quote changes is attributable to humans. Table 5.14 presents these estimates.
As with the impulse response and variance decompositions for AT liquidity demand,
the information shares are calculated each day. Tests of statistical significance are
calculated based on the 13 days for each stock. For the overall estimates, the 390
stock day information share estimates are pooled to calculate standard errors con-
trolling for correlation within each stock’s estimate and controlling for correlation
across stocks on the same day. It is worth recalling that the construction of the
AT and human quotes ensured that whenever there was uncertainty as to whether
or not an AT quote change preceded or followed a close by human quote change,
it is assumed the human quote change occurred first. Therefore, the lower bound
for the AT information share is truly a lower bound, but the upper bound for AT
information share is a lower bound for the true upper bound.
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Table 5.14: Hasbrouck Information Shares: In this table the Hasbrouck Information
Shares are calculated for AT and humans. In Panel A the AT contribution is maximized
by taking the AT first human second ordering. AT-Human reports the difference between
AT and human contribution. The t-stat is calculated using Newey-West standard errors
for each stock and Thompson (2006) standard errors for the entire panel. In Panel B the
human first AT second ordering is rpeorted.
Panel A
Stock AT First Hum Second Diff t-stat
ADS 0.58 0.42 0.16 3.53
ALV 0.56 0.44 0.12 2.9
BAS 0.53 0.47 0.07 1.55
BAY 0.71 0.29 0.41 22.64
BMW 0.65 0.35 0.31 2.74
CBK 0.58 0.42 0.17 1.46
CON 0.51 0.49 0.02 0.21
DAI 0.51 0.49 0.02 0.35
DB1 0.54 0.46 0.08 0.92
DBK 0.55 0.45 0.09 1.54
DPB 0.56 0.44 0.13 1.25
DPW 0.66 0.34 0.32 4.54
DTE 0.72 0.28 0.44 13.92
EON 0.53 0.47 0.07 1.25
FME 0.63 0.37 0.26 5.9
HNK 0.72 0.28 0.44 7.94
HRX 0.48 0.52 -0.04 -0.25
IFX 0.75 0.25 0.50 29.57
LHA 0.72 0.28 0.43 7.61
LIN 0.54 0.46 0.08 0.6
MAN 0.57 0.43 0.13 4.1
MEO 0.69 0.31 0.38 5.89
MRC 0.58 0.42 0.16 1.48
MUV 0.67 0.33 0.35 11.96
RWE 0.65 0.35 0.29 8.56
SAP 0.67 0.33 0.35 5.53
SIE 0.48 0.52 -0.04 -0.75
TKA 0.61 0.39 0.22 2.49
TUI 0.70 0.30 0.40 5.97
VOW 0.55 0.45 0.09 2.07
Overall 0.61 0.39 0.21 9.61
continued below ...
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... continued from Table 5.14
Panel B
Stock AT First Hum Second Diff t-stat
ADS 0.48 0.52 -0.03 -0.67
ALV 0.44 0.56 -0.12 -2.43
BAS 0.43 0.57 -0.13 -3.53
BAY 0.62 0.38 0.23 8.84
BMW 0.57 0.43 0.14 1.04
CBK 0.50 0.50 0.01 0.05
CON 0.43 0.57 -0.15 -1.75
DAI 0.41 0.59 -0.19 -2.36
DB1 0.42 0.58 -0.16 -2.44
DBK 0.42 0.58 -0.17 -3.35
DPB 0.46 0.54 -0.08 -0.79
DPW 0.58 0.42 0.17 2.17
DTE 0.54 0.46 0.08 1.15
EON 0.43 0.57 -0.13 -2.82
FME 0.58 0.42 0.16 3.5
HNK 0.65 0.35 0.31 5.36
HRX 0.41 0.59 -0.18 -1.28
IFX 0.64 0.36 0.27 5.51
LHA 0.65 0.35 0.29 4.73
LIN 0.45 0.55 -0.11 -0.85
MAN 0.47 0.53 -0.05 -1.37
MEO 0.60 0.40 0.19 3.78
MRC 0.50 0.50 -0.01 -0.07
MUV 0.58 0.42 0.15 4.47
RWE 0.55 0.45 0.09 2.89
SAP 0.62 0.38 0.24 3.61
SIE 0.41 0.59 -0.18 -3.14
TKA 0.56 0.44 0.11 1.3
TUI 0.61 0.39 0.21 2.86
VOW 0.44 0.56 -0.12 -2.25
Overall 0.51 0.49 0.03 1.22
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Panel A reports the upper bound estimate for AT information shares and the lower
bound for human information shares. Panel B reverses the ordering to provide the
lower bound estimate for AT information shares and the upper bound for human
information shares. The results in Panel A of Table 5.14 show that in 18 of 30
stocks, AT have statistically significantly higher information shares. For the entire
panel, AT have a 21% higher information share, with a t-statistic of 9.61. In no
stocks do humans have statistically significantly higher information shares than do
AT. The same statistical framework is used as in the previous sections. In Panel
B it can be seen that the lower bound for AT information shares is statistically
significantly higher than the upper bound for humans in 11 stocks while the upper
bound for humans is statistically significantly higher than the lower bound for AT
in eight stocks. Overall, the lower bound on AT information shares is greater than
the upper bound for human, but the difference is not statistically significant.
Comparing the upper and lower bounds on AT and human information shares
in Panels A and B of Table 5.14 shows that 51% of price discovery comes from AT
quotes, 39% of price discovery comes from human quotes, and 10% occurs contem-
poraneously in AT and human quotes. Given that the quote changes are ordered to
favor the human role in price discovery, evidence supports AT playing a larger role
in price discovery, but no evidence is seen suggesting that humans play a larger role.
5.8 Conclusion
Algorithmic trading is studied in terms of its role in the price formation process. It
is found that AT consume liquidity when it is cheap and provide liquidity when it
is expensive. AT contributes more to the discovery of the efficient price than does
human trading. These results demonstrate that AT closely monitor the market in
terms of liquidity and information and react quickly to changes in market conditions.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, no evidence if found of AT behavior that would
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contribute to volatility.
The results have important implications for academics, regulators, and market
operators. Theoretical models of limit order books should allow for a significant frac-
tion of traders who closely monitor the market. These traders could prevent prices
from deviating significantly from fundamentals and prevent spreads from widening
beyond a certain point; both of these features would reduce the dimensionality of
the state space (cf. Goettler, Parlour, and Rajan (2009)). The ATP approved by
the German competition authority appears to have led to behavior that should im-
prove both price efficiency and market liquidity in DAX stocks. However, as with
most financial innovations, there is always the possibility that wide-spread use could
eventually have unexpected negative consequences.
Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
Potential advances in AT are surely not exhausted. Only recently have the possi-
bilities of using algorithms to read news and economic releases begun. Information
providers, such as Dow Jones and Thomson Reuters1 and other specialty informa-
tion providers have just begun to provide machine-readable news for algorithmic
consumption. Other recent developments in the area of financial reporting, such
as the Securities and Exchange Commission’s2 decision to make mandatory what
was previously a voluntary pilot project to provide eXtensible Business Reporting
Language (XBRL), are shaping the information landscape. XBRL is a standardized
business reporting language that makes a firm’s financial reports machine readable
and available in real-time to markets. This program extension is being phased in
over the next 12 months and will become mandatory for all filers by 2010. The
implication of this and other similar projects worldwide are yet to be felt by AT and
markets.
6.1 Future Work
The general direction, of information providers and regulators alike is to make infor-
mation more accessible. The more accessible the information, the lower the cost to
process it. The reduced cost and ease of access to information should translate into
1See: Dow Jones Elementized News Feed and Thomson Reuters NewsScope Sentiment Engine
2See: www.sec.gov - Spotlight on XBRL
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more efficient prices. Making this information more accessible to AT (as well as hu-
man participants) is leading to a shift in competitive factors in the market. Humans
cannot process information as quickly as algorithms but they can, however, expertly
interpret information – especially complex textual information. These factors have
yet to be studied in the literature.
With the increase in machine-readable information, the question will increasingly
become ‘is this information new?’. Humans and AT will have to determine whether
or not a news story or report is new information about a firm or information that is
already reflected in prices. This became painfully obvious in a recent trading debacle
involving United Airlines - ticker UAL. An old news story reporting that United
Airlines was seeking Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection was erroneously processed
as being new information. Algorithms using Google to cull new information ’saw’
the story and began selling UAL shares. Only after a drop of more than 60%
did investors, Google and the exchange realize the problem was in the Google news
algorithm and that a small change in the header of the old story at the South-Florida
Sun Sentinel newspaper was the cause.
As the cost of technology further declines, the application thereof in the trad-
ing process will continue to increase. Even in the current economic crisis, AT has
remained steady and has reportedly risen slightly recently. This raises a number
of obvious questions, posed by regulators and participants alike. How will this in-
creased automation affect trading costs, price discovery and competition in securities
markets? What happens in a market where algorithms are the predominant traders
but are highly sensitive to shocks. Do AT reduce or increase their trading activities?
Are markets with more AT inherently more volatile and is such a situation realistic?
Some of these issues are being addressed directly in joint research projects within
the Information and Market Engineering Graduate School. One study is looking
into whether or not trading strategies based on high-frequency, sentiment-tagged
news are profitable. Within this research project, there are plans to build an AT
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simulation system to test AT strategies but also to gauge their impact on the market
as a whole.
6.2 Summary
This dissertation is one of the first to answer some of the important questions with
regards to AT. The results herein show that AT are not nearly as bad as their
reputation. No evidence is found that would suggest that AT contribute to transitory
volatility. Evidence is found that shows that AT contribute positively to the liquidity
supply and price discovery processes. Evidence is also found that AT act as both
suppliers as well as consumers of liquidity. Their contribution to price discovery is
critical. As markets and information become increasingly more complex and the
sources of these less integrated, our ability to process all of the information for a
specific stock or industry diminishes greatly. By using AT technologies, participants
are able to process more information in a shorter period of time, thereby making
prices more efficient.
Algorithmic traders also appear to contribute positively to liquidity. They are
more likely to supply liquidity when it is dear and consume it when cheap, thereby
smoothing it across time. They are more likely to be at the best for longer when
spreads are wide, as spreads tighten they seem to shift from liquidity supply to
liquidity demand. When spreads tighten, AT are more likely to demand liquidity by
submitting marketable limit orders. This liquidity smoothing finding is quite novel
in that it rejects common beliefs that AT contribute to market instability. There is
no evidence to support the belief that AT contributes to market instability.
One point that was perhaps not stressed enough in the previous chapters is the
human component of AT. In the preceding work, humans are often pitted against
AT as if AT had no human component. AT systems are and will continue to be
programmed, monitored, designed, fixed, and cursed by humans. An algorithm
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 128
in financial markets is no different than a robot in a manufacturing setting. Both
perform the tasks they are assigned until they are assigned new tasks. Certain is that
in AT, humans will continue to play a dominant role. For the investment process
this will hopefully lead to humans being able to spend more time on fundamental
analysis and risk management and less time implementing their trading decisions.
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ATP Agreement 
for participation in the “Automated Trading   
Program” (ATP) via the electronic trading system Xetra®
06/2008 page 1/4 
Deutsche Börse AG, Frankfurt am Main  
  
and 
- hereinafter referred to as "ATP member" - 
hereby conclude the following Agreement. 
§ 1 Object of the Agreement 
The object of this Agreement is participation in Deutsche Börse AG’s “Automated  Trading 
Program” (ATP) by the ATP member. The following provisions apply to this Program. They do 
not affect the  duties and rights arising from the ATP member’s participation in the electronic 
trading System  Xetra .  
§ 2 Definitions 
(1) ATP transactions refer to all transactions that have been generated by an electronic system of  
either the ATP member or the ATP member’s clients, whereby the electronic system has to determine  
two out of the three following order parameters: price (order type and/or order limit where  
applicable), timing (time of order entry) and quantity (quantity of the order in number of securities).  
As a principle, the number of ATP transactions should negatively correlate with the Xetra  
transaction fee level i.e. reduced Xetra  transaction fees should systematically result in an increased  
number of ATP transactions. Furthermore ATP transactions must be channelled into the electronic  
trading system Xetra  using an ATP User-ID. 
®
® 
®
(2) The electronic system that generates the ATP transactions must fulfil the following requirements:
The electronic system must generate buy or sell orders independently, i.e. without frequent 
manual intervention, using a specified program and data; 
The generated orders have to be channelled directly into the electronic trading system Xetra 
without further manual intervention; 
®
The exchange fees or the fees charged by the ATP member to its clients have to be directly or 
indirectly considered by the electronic system when determining the order parameters. 
®
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(3) The following types of transactions in particular are not classed as ATP transactions for the 
purposes of the ATP Initiative: 
Transactions that are channelled into the electronic trading system Xetra  using the Xetra 
account types D (Designated Sponsor), E (Best Executor), I (Issuer) and L (Liquidity 
Provider); 
® ®
Transactions that are channelled into the electronic trading system Xetra via order routing 
without originally being generated within the meaning of Section 2 (1) and (2).   
®
(4) Introductory ATP Member shall mean any newly registered ATP member or any existing ATP 
member whose ATP trading volume has not qualified for an ATP rebate in the recent 24 months.  
§ 3 ATP rebates 
(1) ATP rebate rates as set out in the “Price List for the Utilization of the Trading System of the 
Frakfurt Stock Exchange” apply to ATP transactions within the meaning of Section 2 of this 
Agreement. 
(2) ATP rebate rates as set out in the “Price List for the Utilization of the Trading System of the 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange” will not be included in the existing Xetra  fee reporting (e.g. trade 
confirmation, fee  reports), but will only be taken into account for monthly invoicing purposes. 
®
§ 4 Duties of the ATP member and Deutsche Börse AG 
(1) In order to participate in the ATP Initiative, the ATP member undertakes to register one or more  
ATP User-IDs, which will be used exclusively for ATP transactions within the meaning of Section 2  
of this Agreement and which will be under the responsibility of exchange traders  approved by the 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange. The ATP member undertakes to register different ATP  User-IDs for its 
own ATP transactions and for ATP transactions of the ATP member’s clients.  Registration is a 
prerequisite for participation in the ATP Initiative. The registration form  “Application for the 
Approval of an ATP User-ID” attached to this Agreement must  be used to register the ATP User-IDs. 
(2) Upon registration of its ATP User-IDs, the ATP member undertakes to provide Deutsche Börse  
AG with a general description of the different types of ATP transactions of the ATP member as well 
as the ATP member’s clients. The description has to be provided as laid out in the registration form  
“Application for the Approval of an ATP User-ID”. 
(3) The ATP member will undertake best efforts to ensure that all transactions of its clients that are  
channelled into the electronic trading system Xetra  using the ATP User-ID are within the meaning  
of Section 2 of this Agreement; the ATP member verifies and documents the  compliance of its 
clients’ transactions with Section 2 on a regular basis. If the ATP member suspects 
®
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or ascertains that orders of its clients do not comply with Section 2 he shall notify Deutsche Börse 
AG immediately thereof. 
(4) Deutsche Börse AG will not disclose any confidential information about the ATP member or the  
ATP member’s clients it may receive in connection with this Agreement to any third  party, unless 
provided by this Agreement or required by law. The ATP member  hereby authorizes Deutsche Börse 
AG to disclose the member’s ATP User-IDs, the respective  numbers of executed ATP orders in 
instruments cleared by Eurex Clearing AG and the respective  ATP rebates to Eurex Clearing AG and 
Eurex Clearing AG is hereby authorized to disclose such data  in the monthly invoicing to its Clearing 
Member which clears the ATP transactions of the ATP  member. The ATP member hereby further 
authorizes Deutsche Börse AG to disclose information to  the Frankfurt Stock Exchange’s Trading 
Surveillance Office, to the extent that is necessary to monitor  the ATP member’s compliance with the 
duties incumbent upon it as a result of this Agreement. 
§ 5 Term/Notice of termination 
(1) The ATP Agreement runs for an indefinite period of time. Each party may terminate  this 
Agreement with 3 months notice, with the effect as per the end of a calendar  month.  
(2) Deutsche Börse AG’s right of extraordinary termination without notice for good cause shall 
remain unaffected hereby. Good cause shall in particular be given, if:
the ATP member or its agents - despite a prior notice of default - commits a breach of 
material duties arising from this Agreement; 
there is a substantiated suspicion that the ATP member is using its registered ATP User-IDs  
for purposes other than for ATP transactions within the meaning of Section 2 of this 
Agreement. In the latter case, Deutsche Börse AG has the additional right to  abstain from 
its extraordinary termination right and instead suspend the ATP member from  participating 
in the ATP initiative for the suspicious period of time. 
(3) The ATP member shall have a right of extraordinary termination without notice in the event that 
Deutsche Börse AG – despite a prior notice of default – commits a breach of material duties arising  
from this Agreement. 
(4) Notice of termination shall be by way of written declaration to the other contracting party.
§ 6 Final provisions 
(1) This Agreement may be unilaterally changed by Deutsche Börse AG, conditional  upon the 
ATP member being given at least 6 weeks notice of the changes in written form. Such 
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unilateral changes shall entitle the ATP member to terminate the Agreement,  effective at the 
time the unilateral changes take effect. In the event, the ATP member has not  objected in 
writing to Deutsche Börse AG, the ATP member shall be deemed to have accepted  the change. 
In case of objection, Deutsche Börse AG is entitled to terminate this Agreement with effect  at 
the time the unilateral changes take effect. Any termination requires the  written form.
(2) This Agreement is governed by the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany.  Place of 
jurisdiction for both contracting parties in the event of disputes arising from this Agreement shall 
be Frankfurt am Main. 
(3) In the event that any individual provision of this Agreement should be or become  invalid or 
impracticable, this shall not affect the validity of the other provisions hereof. Any invalid  
contractual provision shall be replaced either by the statutory rule or (in the event of absence of such 
a rule) such provision as the parties would have admissibly adopted in good faith if they had been  
aware of the invalidity or nullity of the term that it replaces. The same shall apply insofar as it shall  
be determined that the contractual regulations are incomplete.
(4) This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement and supersedes all prior  agreements and 
understandings with respect to the subject matter hereof. The parties agree that any  mutual claims 
resulting from any prior agreement are herewith deemed to be discharged by the  execution of this 
agreement. 
Place and date 
For the ATP member For the ATP members compliance department 
(Company stamp and authorized signatures including names in block letters) 
For Deutsche Börse AG
ATP Agreement 
for participation in the “Automated Trading   
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List of Abbreviations
AA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Algorithmic Agency
AT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Algorithmic Trading
CATS . . . . . . . . . . . . Computer Aided Trading System
DB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Deutsche Boerse
ECN . . . . . . . . . . . . . Electronic Communications Network
FIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Financial Information eXchange
LSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . London Stock Exchange
MCap . . . . . . . . . . . Market Capitalization
NYSE . . . . . . . . . . . New York Stock Exchange
OMS . . . . . . . . . . . . Order Management System
PT/SA . . . . . . . . . . Proprietary Trading and Statistical Arbitrage
VAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . Vector Autoregression
VMA . . . . . . . . . . . . Vector Moving Average
XBRL . . . . . . . . . . . eXtensible Business Reporting Language
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